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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores mobility and service access of refugees who have been
resettled in a non-traditional smaller-city immigrant destination of Columbia, South
Carolina. I show that delivery of basic refugee social services varies based on support
from individual states while federal expectations for refugees to reach economic selfsufficiency are applied equally across the US. I argue that mobility is a major challenge
in obtaining these goals, further exacerbated in the context of a smaller resettlement site.
Although redistribution to smaller metropolitan areas may provide refugees safer and
more affordable housing, less spatial distance to traverse (Mott, 2010), they often lack
access to services and resources such as public transportation, English language services,
low-wage job markets, and similar ethnic communities compared to those in larger
metropolitan areas (Singer & Wilson, 2006; Bose, 2014). Through participant
observation and semi-structured interviews with refugees and service providers, I aim to
answer how these federal policies play out at the scale of the local, and the degree to
which refugees are able to satisfy neoliberal federal directives. This research has the
potential to contribute to scholarship on refugee resettlement in the US and practitioner
literature.
Key terms: refugee resettlement, policy, mobility, self-sufficiency
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This research investigates the provision of services to refugees in Columbia,
South Carolina, and asks to what extent the current system of resettlement successfully
aids refugees in a localized context. While in the past government-led resettlement
mostly placed refugees in larger traditional immigrant gateway cities, in recent years
resettlement agencies have dispersed refugees to smaller metropolitan areas, including to
“New South” immigrant gateways (Winders, 2006; Brettell, et al., 2008) such as
Columbia. On the one hand, dispersal to smaller cities may benefit refugees through
features such as more affordable housing, less spatial distance to traverse, and lower
crime rates (Mott, 2010). On the other hand, refugees who are resettled in smaller metro
areas may have access to fewer services and resources such as public transportation,
English language services, low-wage job markets, and similar ethnic communities
compared to those in larger metro areas (Singer & Wilson, 2006). Voluntary agencies
(henceforth known as VOLAGs) are contracted by the U.S. government to provide
services for refugee populations, but many of these organizations are severely undersupported or unable to provide services due to limited state participation, as is the case in
South Carolina. When services are provided, access may be limited due to a mismatch
between refugee housing areas and areas with service providers and employment
opportunities, and due to a lack of transport between these destinations.
When the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was
established in 1950, refugee resettlement in the US was administered at a local level and
1

church-based (Nawyn, 2006) and largely driven by cold war imperatives (Gibney, 2004).
This process has since been restructured, owing to The Refugee Act of 1980. Motivated
by the large numbers of Vietnamese refugees coming to the US, the act adopted the
U.N.’s definition of refugee, standardized domestic services provided to refugees (by
contracting VOLAGs, many of which are religious organizations), and authorized
Congress to set annual ceilings for funding and the number of refugees admitted. Since
1980, over 3 million refugees have resettled in the US from over 40 countries, making the
US the Western leader in refugee resettlement since World War II (Gibney, 2004). Aside
from the U.S. government’s humanitarian ambitions, much of the reasoning behind
liberal refugee relocation policies were politically motivated by the desire to weaken
communist regimes such as the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Cuba. Anti-communist
policy objectives were so closely tied with refugee resettlement that prior to 1980,
refugees fleeing from non-communist countries had no status under U.S. law; even after
1980, those fleeing U.S.-backed regimes such as Haiti and El Salvador were far less
likely to be granted refugee status than Cubans (ibid.)
In the decades since the end of the Cold War, resettlement policy has reflected the
ability of the President to grant more or fewer acceptance slots from world regions
depending on current crises and political impetus. The Presidential Determination on
Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2016 states outright that overseas refugee applicants
will “contribute to the foreign policy interests of the United States and designate such
persons for this purpose” (Obama 2015). The annual cap is currently 70,000; in light of
the Syrian refugee crisis, Secretary of State Kerry announced the 2016 minimum will be
85,000 and in 2017, increased to 100,000 (U.S. Department of State, 2015).
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Not only have the numbers of accepted refugees and their regions of origins
shifted, but so has the geographical distribution of refugees resettled across the US.
Throughout most of the past century, immigrants were concentrated in five immigrant
gateway states: New York, California, Florida, Texas, and Illinois. However, during the
1980s, residence patterns moved towards populating small and midsized communities
across the nation, most notably in the South and Midwest (O’Neil & Tienda, 2010).
Refugee resettlement has both mirrored the larger immigrant pattern as well as differed
from it. While refugees have historically been placed in smaller cities on an individual
sponsorship basis (Kelly, 1986), the formalization of this process has increased numbers
of refugees distributed to smaller metropolitan areas across more states. The Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR) influenced current settlement trends beginning in the 1980s
when they placed Vietnamese refugees in smaller metropolitan areas and suburbs to more
evenly disperse the burden on social service programs. Further, the transition away from
an urban-manufacturing economy in the US has shifted the landscape of economic
opportunity to more rural locations (Hardwick in Brettell et al., 2008), which presents
more employment options for refugees placed in smaller cities and thus more impetus to
remain where they are first settled. This shift in resettlement has placed refugees in areas
that have less experience with diverse populations (Fennelly & Leitner, 2002; Singer &
Wilson, 2006). As refugees continue to be placed in diversifying locations across the US,
it becomes more important to study how refugees experience smaller cities and these
locations’ capacity to effectively meet federal standards of resettlement.
There are approximately 59.5 million forcibly displaced people in the world,
which includes refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) and other ‘persons of
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concern’ to UNHCR, such as asylum-seekers and stateless people (Crawford, et al.,
2015). Forty percent of displaced people live in refugee camps with an estimated average
length of stay of 17 years (Loescher & Milner, 2006). This lengthy period of time in
limbo, or “protracted displacement” (meaning being in displacement for at least three
years) is the norm, rather than the exception. Over the past decade, nearly 80% of
refugees worldwide were in a state of protracted displacement at any one time (Crawford,
et al., 2015). After oftentimes lengthy stays as displaced people, the top-down process of
refugee resettlement to the US begins when an applicant is referred to the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program for consideration as a refugee. Cases that are identified by UNHCR,
a U.S. embassy, or a designated non-governmental organization are top priority and
generally must be residing outside their country of origin (U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, 2016). This is contrasted with asylum seekers, who apply for
refugee status once they are already in the US and must prove themselves that they are,
for whatever reason, unable to return to their home countries.
After the bureaucratic journey towards resettlement, if the Department of
Homeland Security accepts a refugee’s application, the ORR in New York determines
which one of nine national VOLAGs will be responsible for which refugees. These
include: Church World Service, Ethiopian Community Development Council, Episcopal
Migration Ministries, HIAS (formerly known as Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society),
International Rescue Committee, US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, Lutheran
Immigration and Refugee Services, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, and
World Relief Corporation (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees,
and Migration, 2011). Representatives from these VOLAGs then choose to place a

4

refugee in a particular location depending on vacancies for new arrivals, country of
origin, family size, religious preferences, and medical needs (Mott, 2010). Although aid
workers seek to place refugees with family members, refugees do not have a choice in
which state/city they will be placed. The intricate, opaque, and hierarchical nature of U.S.
refugee resettlement is further complicated by the fact that VOLAGs generally do not
interact with each other.
Given the tumultuous pathways that many refugees experience prior to their final
destinations in U.S. cities, the question arises of how to best facilitate their transition into
their new homeland. This transition involves navigating an entirely new way of life in a
new place in a new language while simultaneously reaching “economic self-sufficiency”
in mere months. This nationwide standard seeks to wean refugees off of any financial
assistance as soon as possible, regardless of how impossible a standard it is to reach.
Many resettled refugees have spent a considerable amount of their lives as displaced
people in locations dissimilar to Western cities. Further, a large number of refugees come
from agrarian lifestyles and must adjust to work within the rigid structure of a cash-based
economy upon arrival to the US in order to survive. Success of acclimating to Western
lifestyles and meeting the demands of an hourly wage job greatly depend upon a person’s
ability to, first and foremost, simply show up at their job. Refugees with very limited
English are able to find low-skilled jobs, but they first must be able to access
transportation in order to keep these jobs. Beyond economic demands of getting to work,
refugees must also find their way to buy food, go to essential physical and mental health
appointments, and to access social services. Mobility matters; this “new American”
population can only succeed if they can physically move about their new cities.

5

The question of refugee mobility within the context of smaller new Southern
gateway cities is quite complex and layered. How do the spatial layout and less extensive
public transportation systems in smaller cities like Columbia affect refugees’
experiences? These inquiries can be linked to the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis (SMH)
(Kain 1968; Kasarda 1993), which connects poor employment outcomes among African
American urban residents to racial discrimination in the suburban housing market, the
decentralization of jobs to the suburbs, and limited transportation options. While there is
significant evidence supporting this hypothesis with regard to African Americans,
geographers have questioned its applicability to immigrants, especially those living
outside the old industrial core (Parks, 2004; Painter et al., 2007; Ellis et al., 2007; Liu &
Painter 2012). While not dismissing the relevance of spatial mismatch, I use refugees’
travel narratives to explore what other barriers may exist specifically for refugees in
terms of accessing resources. I also broaden the examination of mismatch to include more
than just the distance between home and work, emphasizing the various locations
refugees must access for basic household reproduction. This requires consideration not
only of raw distance between place of residence and employment opportunities, but also
access to the means of mobility.
1.1 The Research
Research on refugee resettlement in the US has grown since the 1980s, and has
received increasing media attention. Recently, research on refugee resettlement in smaller
cities has emerged, particularly in the Canadian context (Sherrell, et al., 2005; Hyndman,
et al., 2006; Drolet & Robertson, 2011) and less so in the European and US (Wren, 2003;
Cadge, et al., 2010; Bose, 2014). These studies have focused on economic adaptation of
6

refugees in smaller U.S. cities (Allen, 2009) and healthcare availability (Edward &
Hines-Martin, 2014). Studies have also examined the U.S. South as a new context for
immigrant incorporation (Winders, 2006) and as an evolving space of belonging in an
historical context of racial segregation (C.R. Nagel 2013; Nagel & Ehrkamp, 2016).
However, there has not been much in-depth research on refugee resettlement nor on
refugee mobility in cities like Columbia, South Carolina. As resettlement is increasingly
redistributed to smaller cities across the Midwest and the South, it is imperative that
academics consider questions of what this resettlement looks like not just in theory or at a
policy level, but on the ground. By examining both the positive and negative aspects of
placing refugees in these new locales, policymakers will be able to anticipate and address
the needs of this underserved population.

1.2 Organization of this Thesis
In the following chapters, I address my primary research questions by examining
theoretical frameworks and then grounding them in qualitative research that expresses the
lived experiences of refugees in Columbia. Chapter two provides a review of the
literature focused on the neoliberal welfare state, geographical mobility, and then situates
these themes within a smaller city context. In chapter three, I describe my methodological
approach to the study and outline my data collection and analysis.
My analysis of the research is divided into two main chapters. Chapter four details
the hierarchical scales at which policies are made and financial aid is distributed and how
top-down processes play out in localities. I explain the various federal and state programs
available to refugees in South Carolina. As LSC is in an intermediary position between
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enforcing regulations and helping newly arrived refugees, I ask how this position affects
service delivery and relationships with refugee clients. I also highlight refugee voices to
express how these rules and their regulations affect their livelihoods and integration.
Finally, I discuss the concept of “success” and contrast how various actors in the process
define successful resettlement. Addressing how welfare state restructuring affects refugee
success in a smaller city such as Columbia has implications for the multiple new
immigrant gateway cities across the US.
In chapter five, I utilize Flamm and Kaufmann’s (2006) theoretical framework of
motility as a basis for elucidating grounded refugee experiences. First, by commenting on
the structural shortcomings of local public transit such as sparse and infrequent bus
routes, I show how refugees struggle to utilize the few structural resources available to
them. Second, I examine the necessary skills refugees must develop in order to become
more mobile. This includes seeking training on how to navigate bus routes, acquiring
competence in English, and possessing the physical ability to walk between bus stops.
Also relevant is social and human capital, to which refugees have varied access. Those
who are connected with a large social network are able to create alternative pathways to
mobility (through co-ethnic bus training and carpooling) despite the complicated urban
structure. Finally, I look at the appropriation of aforementioned infrastructural landscapes
and skills – that is, how individual choice and positionality influence a person’s access to
the structures and skills that make them mobile. By examining the limitations of
structural transit and skills training in Columbia, I consider to what extent refugees are
able to assert their own agency and fulfill government requisites.
Chapter six concludes this thesis by considering needed improvements to the U.S.
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resettlement system. I address to what extent refugees are able to fulfill neoliberal
demands by asserting their own agency in such an environment of a small city in an
unsupportive state. Taking this into account, I focus on pragmatic avenues for working
within current constraints. I also suggest avenues for future research in this site and
similar contexts.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE
My research draws upon three main bodies of literature on the geographies of
neoliberal service provision, refugee mobility, and refugee resettlement in smaller cities.
In this thesis, these three areas are connected in order to interpret refugee experiences in
Columbia. My objective is to highlight how the scale at which policies are made affects
the provision of refugee services and refugees’ access to these services. I detail federal
standards of services that refugees receive and the varying degree that each state
complies with these standards. The most important goal of the U.S. government emerges
as getting refugees to obtain economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible. Ensuring
delivery of social services, however, is evidently much less vital. As refugee support has
been scaled back over time, refugees are being asked to do more with fewer resources. I
then argue that one of the most important resources to obtaining self-sufficiency is
mobility. I explore the multiple factors that contribute to a refugee’s (im)mobility and
highlight how unmanageable it is for refugees to fulfill neoliberal demands of selfsufficiency without being able to move freely about his or her city. I then contextualize
these themes by discussing refugee resettlement in smaller U.S. cities. While there are
positive aspects of resettlement in smaller cities, refugees face multiple challenges that
further complicate the process of beginning a new life. Refugees also have the capacity to
fill a void in declining small cities’ workforce, and, by neoliberal standards, should be
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welcomed for their economic merit. By combining these three subject areas, I establish a
background for refugee resettlement in Columbia, SC.
2.1 Geographies of Neoliberal Service Provision
In migration literature and policy, refugees have been situated as distinctive
among immigrants because while they do not choose their placement, they do receive
state support. In contrast to “voluntary” immigrants, who have little access to
government-run social services, refugees are eligible to receive state services ranging
from six months to five years, depending on the state (Nawyn, 2006). While this position
is privileged relative to all other immigrants to the US, it is also the most scrutinized and
regulated, with strict state expectations imposed on refugees in order to receive services.
Understanding refugees’ circumstances thus requires an examination of federal
resettlement policy and the ways that federal policies distinguish between more-or-less
deserving newcomers.
American lawmakers have applied the notion of deservingness differently to
immigrants and refugees. The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act restricted welfare services for both documented and undocumented
immigrants, though preserved them for refugees due to their perceived merit (Anderson,
et al., 2002). The 70,000 chosen few who are resettled in the US annually are labeled as
deserving victims of undemocratic governments/regimes and are considered helpless and
in need of Western protection (Nagel & Ehrkamp, 2016). Cadge, et al., (2010) explain
that since many African refugees have histories of trauma as child soldiers and as victims
of torture and political oppression or civil war and famine, they are placed higher in
hierarchies of deservingness than are fellow dark-skinned African American recipients of
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social services, who are often coded as “welfare queens” in contemporary neoliberal
discourse (p. 9). Refugees are idealized as being in a malleable state of citizenship, and
their fresh new start in America provides the opportunity to be molded into productive
“New Americans” (Winders, 2006). The emphasis on productivity in order to be
included in social citizenship is best described as the “neoliberal citizenship ratio”, or the
proportion of able-bodied, employable adults relative to family members who need
support (Grace, et al., 2016). That is, it is only by increasing work-eligible household
members that refugees are able to make ends meet under neoliberal constraints.
Although refugees are viewed as deserving and thus earn more benefits than those
considered economic migrants, they have more stipulations attached to those benefits.
The federal government’s say in what an immigrant must do drastically increases when
that immigrant is eligible for financial assistance. Assistance for refugees, in other words,
is much deserved, much needed, and much regulated. This discussion of deservingness
constructed at the federal scale is passed down through individual state narratives and
finally dispersed at the local. On an individual level, a person’s worth and deservingness
to access basic human services comes secondary to his or her aptitude to get a job.
Understanding refugee resettlement requires an analysis of the structure and
geography of service delivery, and especially the devolution of service provision to the
states and the voluntary sector. Refugee policy reform in 1980 corresponded with broader
welfare reform efforts that involved a growing use of voluntary and faith-based agencies
to deliver social services. The voluntary sector became more involved in delivering direct
social services, now officially funded by the government instead of through agencies
working independently. While responsibility for service delivery was offset to non-
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governmental organizations forming a “shadow state”, the state sector’s role turned to
greater policing of this provision (Wolch, 1990). The state has increased policing of the
organizations that deliver services as well as the individuals who receive services through
increased regulatory restrictions (i.e. drug testing, limiting eligible SNAP food items to
bare necessities) (Trudeau, 2012).
This general devolution of federal welfare has led to greater responsibility at the
individual state level, which has generated incredibly uneven and fragmented service
provision from state to state. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 coupled citizenship requirements with economic
“personal responsibility”, a response to legislators’ concerns that welfare dependency
was the cause of societal ills. Aihwa Ong succinctly describes how welfare state
restructuring has made life in America “the civic duty of the individual to reduce his or
her burden on society, and instead to build up his or her own human capital” (Ong, 2003
in Trudeau, 2012 p. 444). Even thought it views refugees as deserving of social services,
the federal government seeks to cap the charitable benefits it offers to refugees. The
number of refugees admitted has declined from over 200,000 in the 1980s to 74,000
today (Allen, 2009), and the federal government has reduced cash assistance from 36
months to a minimum of 3 months. Supplementary Security Income (SSI) and disability
is available to refugees by the same standards as the native-born population (over the age
of 66). Those states who subscribe to the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion
program allow refugees to access Medicaid for up to five years; because South Carolina
does not, they are only able to access Medicaid for eight months (Wasem, 2014).
Likewise, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is offered on a state level
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basis; South Carolina does not offer TANF to refugees. PRWORA’s effect on refugee
welfare access is evident, as from 1994 to 1999 overall refugee utilization of TANF
declined by 78%, food stamps by 53%, and Medicaid by 36% (Fix & Passel, 1999).
In writing this thesis, the difficulty in finding consistent information about the
minimum standards for resettlement revealed how intentionally opaque the process is.
While Wasem (2014) outlines the federal amount of time refugees are eligible for
assistance, this does not represent the minimum amounts that individual states must
provide benefits. Tricky wording in PRWORA introduces the term “qualified aliens”,
which basically leaves individual states to decide which noncitizens are eligible for
federal benefits (Wasem, 2014). This loophole has allowed South Carolina to skirt
responsibilities of providing basic services to refugees and have done less than what
federal minimums dictate. Simply, some states are non-compliant in fulfilling refugee
requirements, and there is little to no oversight in assuring these requirements are met.
Not only are there disparities in the monetary amounts and length of assistance
conflicting, but different states draw on difference sources of funding. The federal
government disperses refugee cash assistance (RCA) and refugee medical assistance
(RMA) through one of three ways:
1. Private-sector/non-profit administered: After the 1980 Refugee Act that gave cash
assistance directly to states, Congress passed the Wilson Fish Amendment in 1984 that
enabled Office of Refugee Resettlement to make available funding for projects that test
“alternative approaches” to cash assistance, medical assistance, social services, and case
management. It is less bureaucratic than public programs and more outcome and
performance-based, but refugees in this state are not eligible for Temporary Assistance
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for Needy Families (TANF)/Medicaid because it would be considered repetitive funding
(Hohm, et al., 1999). Essentially, Wilson-Fish grants an certain amount of funds to
refugees which is distributed evenly over a given period regardless of their job status.
This is the case for Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and San
Diego county, CA.
2. Public-private partnerships: These states are generally known as having superior
resettlement, likely due to their dual funding. Their case management is funded from
state money, so state level government prioritizes refugee resettlement as something
worth funding. Structurally, they are able to provide supplementary programs such as
EFL training for newly arrived refugee children. Unlike Wilson-Fish states, these states
are able to access Matching Grant funds through the ORR for up to six months total (a
program which I detail in chapter 4) and TANF/Medicaid for eight months. This applies
to five states: Maryland, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas.
3. State administered program: These states could be considered the least supportive of
refugee resettlement as a whole. They are able to access Matching Grant funds as well as
TANF/Medicaid and receive standard Reception & Placement funds through the federal
government. It also includes state programs, which are run by the Department of Social
Services in the case of South Carolina. Unlike private-sector/non-profit administered
resettlement, State-administered programs provide more cash assistance to refugees in the
first month and wane the amount of monies over the following months. If a refugee gets a
job before the cash assistance period is up, they will not receive the remainder that they
are owed, which critics say provides little impetus for refugees to obtain employment
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quickly. Also, since there are no private beneficiaries, resettlement is generally less
funded and not a priority in these states. Resettlement is run this way in the remainder of
states, including South Carolina.
The U.S. government’s main goal in resettlement is to form employable and
economically self-sufficient citizens first and foremost (Trudeau, 2012). This theme of
self-sufficiency is evident throughout multiple documents and mission statements of the
federal government, the ORR, and VOLAGs. The state department’s Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration website features a header that reads: “Although
refugees are eligible for public assistance when they first arrive, the U.S. Government
emphasizes early economic self-sufficiency through employment to speed their
integration into American society” (U.S. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration,
2011). This statement serves to assure worried taxpayers that their money is only
providing the bare minimum welfare safety net and also suggests it is the most beneficial
method to “integrate” refugees. The ORR claims that they aim “to provide for the
effective resettlement of refugees and to assist them to achieve economic self-sufficiency
as quickly as possible” (Refugee Resettlement Program, 2012, p. 345). Like the federal
government’s message, the ORR emphasizes the haste to wean refugees off of the
taxpayer dollar.
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services (LIRS) also promotes this
buzzphrase, stating on their refugee page, “Self-sufficiency is key to successful
integration into American society. LIRS helps newcomers by engaging local churches
and communities in the resettlement process and by promoting employment and
providing training and support to local job developers” (Lutheran Immigration and
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Refugee Services, 2016). Unlike the federal and state websites, LIRS does not mention
efficiency and quickness of weaning refugees off of welfare, but rather focus on how they
help refugees achieve self-sufficiency. Clearly the most important goal for refugee
resettlement, self-sufficiency is a malleable term that may be thought of differently by
different people, including refugees themselves.
The current overarching political debate concerning what constitutes a living
wage in the US affects native-born poor and refugees alike. Can any person working a
full-time minimum wage job be considered self-sufficient? Given the federal
government’s stipulation that refugees must accept the first “appropriate” job they are
offered (i.e. small women are not expected to work in a position lifting heavy boxes), it
seems the goal is not to become self-sufficient, but rather to have enough income to be
disqualified from unemployment benefits. The kinds of jobs refugees are qualified for
generally provide wages that make it impossible to be economically independent.
Resettlement agencies across the US must follow the government’s rules, and instead of
working to incorporate newcomers into economies and communities by providing
English language education and specific technical skillset training, they “serve to prepare
them for minimum-wage, entry level jobs that provide incomes insufficient for paying
bills and that provide few possibilities for long-term social advancement, economic
stability, or educational opportunity” (Warriner, 2007 p. 355). What, then, does the
provision of services for a population that is widely considered to be “deserving” but
under supported look like on a local scale? And to what extent does it fulfill the aims set
forth by the federal government and by VOLAGs?

17

Examining how VOLAGs interact with refugees and enforce higher-scale federal
goals is getting to the heart of the question of how services are delivered in a specific site.
As VOLAGs are forced to be intermediaries between the state’s aims and the
precariously placed refugee, their success in functionality and organization have much
influence on how successful a refugee will be. On the macro level, VOLAGs directly
make a difference in a refugee’s life because refugees do not choose their primary
resettlement city, but rather go where VOLAG decisions related to government policy
may accommodate them. Thus, VOLAGs change the geographical settlement patterns of
refugees broadly across the US through “directed migration” (Brown, et al., 2007). Once
a refugee has been assigned to a particular city, VOLAGs then have a part in placing
refugees within the city, typically guided by low-cost housing (Forrest & Brown, 2014).
VOLAGs shape refugee experience at a micro level through personal interactions
and by implementing monetary, health, education, and career placement services (Mott,
2010; Yako & Biswas, 2014). They enforce federal regulations by making clear the rules
the government has set forth as well as the consequences for non-compliance. As an
intermediary between the state and refugees, VOLAGs are in a caretaker role that brings
refugees to expect a certain amount of care (Brown, 2011). Refugees who do not have
any prior connections to family or social networks in the US (known as “free cases”) rely
more heavily on VOLAGs than those who are placed through family reunification
(Brown et al., 2007). Mott (2010) cited incidents where refugees decided to move due to
shortcomings of VOLAGs in the primary settlement cities: they cut off aid earlier than
promised, did not offer transportation to work, or simply abandoned the refugee after
initial reception. In an interview with recently resettled Iraqi refugees, Yako & Biswas

18

(2014) found that the stress of resettlement was further exacerbated due to sentiment that
“resettlement agencies make us feel like we were brought here and dumped here” (p.
139). In contrast to these negative VOLAG relationships, refugees may move to a city
due to the local VOLAG’s reputation of providing a high quality of services (Mott,
2010). Thus, while VOLAGs may create a spatial mismatch by placing refugees in poorly
located housing, a well-organized VOLAG staff’s guidance about navigating the city can
help empower refugees with their own mobility.
VOLAGs directly shape a refugees’ experience, but the crux of these rules are
state mandates that dictate how much support a refugee receives. Refugee welfare policy
in South Carolina skirts the line between helping “worthy victims” and begrudgingly
providing requisite support. Service delivery varies by the willingness of particular states
to provide support for refugees. If welfare benefits and social services are available, one
must question, in a localized context: what other hindrances are there to refugees
receiving services? On a basic level, are refugees able to physically access these services
and ultimately meet neoliberal demands of economic self-sufficiency?
2.2 Mobility
The multi-scalar nature of the process that directly affect refugees’ lives
complicate their capacity to be included in a community, navigate urban environments,
and access the services they need to fulfill federally mandated “self-sufficiency” goals.
The ability to move about a city are especially salient in new refugee resettlement cities
and require further inquiry. In order to gauge to what extent traversing these spatial
barriers is a challenge, I consider the applicability of a theory previously used in a
different context: Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis (SMH) (Kain, 1968). Spatial mismatch
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attempted to name the geographic disconnect between low-income African American
household locations and available employment. Kain hypothesized and found empirical
support that poor employment outcomes among African American urban residents could
be explained by racial discrimination in the suburban housing market, the
decentralization of jobs to the suburbs, and limited transportation options.
Although this study was based in mid-fifties Detroit and Chicago and focused
only on job attainability of African Americans, it echoes mobility issues prominent for
refugees today. Kain details how African Americans were “forced to choose between
buying a private automobile and thus spending a disproportionate share of their low
incomes on transportation, making a very long and circuitous trip by public transit (if any
service [was] available at all), or foregoing the job altogether” (p. 181). Besides sheer
lack of transit access, Kain noted the lack of information about jobs distant from African
American housing as well as increased discrimination from suburban employers, which
still merit discussion.
Gobillon, et al. (2007) reasserted the relevancy of Spatial Mismatch in application
to African Americans but called for more studies with a comparative perspective amongst
minority groups. Geographers, likewise, have questioned the applicability of the concept
of spatial mismatch to immigrants (Parks, 2004; Painter, et al., 2007; Liu & Painter,
2012). Liu & Painter (2012) examined immigrant demographic changes in sixty
metropolitan areas in the US from 1980-2000 and concluded that as jobs continue to
suburbanize, so do immigrant residential locations, creating a “closing the gap” effect.
This concept, while accurate in pointing to general immigrant and immigrant job
settlement patterns, ignores the fact that these jobs tend to be decentralized in suburb
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settings. That is, just because both jobs and immigrants are both in suburbs does not
mean they are close by, or, given the infrequency of bus routes from one suburb to the
next, accessible. The authors also failed to differentiate between high skilled and low
skilled immigrants, therefore ignoring social class, which is a key factor in spatial
mismatch. Similarly, the authors did not measure unemployment rates of each population,
which would further illuminate patterns of settlement and employment opportunities
among various groups. One useful conclusion from Liu & Painter is that there are no
sweeping conclusions that can be made across U.S. cities. Local contexts are far too
specific to expect similar patterns, accessibility, and rates of “success”. This localization
makes it important to consider SMH in a smaller city, which introduces a host of various
other issues.
If a person can travel to his or her destination in a cost-effective, timely manner,
distance matters less. Kain’s (1968) original hypothesis does identify limited transit
options as a small part of spatial mismatch, but modern applications focus solely on
mobility challenges as the root of the problem. Blumenberg & Manville (2004) look
beyond the spatial mismatch and consider other obstacles that working poor face.
Although they assert spatial mismatch still has merit for some, poor and nonpoor
populations generally live similar distances from their workplaces. The difference is that
traveling between the two distances is much more difficult for the poor, and that
transportation modal mismatch is the true plight of the poor. The need to increase
mobility by more effective transit modes is about more than convenience; it has larger
implications for acculturation, self-empowerment, and community building (Bose, 2014;
Fan, 2012). Even if refugees are able to access jobs, they are often low-waged; however,
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mobility offers the opportunity to work more than one job during various shifts that may
help accumulate savings. Beyond access to place of employment, a person’s mobility has
implications for their broader access to the city and overall well-being.
While SMH offers a compelling theory as to why marginalized groups face
challenges accessing employment, I argue that it is only a minor part to explain a broader
phenomenon of refugee mobility. It focuses solely on employment, which mutes the
importance of access to social services, education, and other daily activities a person
fulfills. My thesis seeks to build upon previous mobility studies that expand the definition
of what makes a person mobile (Kaufmann, 2002; Flamm & Kaufmann, 2006; Uteng,
2009; Cresswell, 2010; Cresswell & Merriman, 2011; Kaufmann, 2011). Limiting the
study of mobility to transport and focusing solely on structural aspects of mobility as
SMH does ignores the contextual reasons that lead to variations in mobility across
populations. Uteng (2009) considers trips that were not made due to other constraining
social, cultural, technological, infrastructural, political, and financial factors (p. 1056).
For example, Uteng’s gendered mobility study of Middle-Eastern women in Norway
suggests that many immigrant wives feel unsafe and are less apt to make trips without
their husbands. While social fear of navigating the city played a role, cultural norms often
dictated that immigrant women were far less independently mobile from their husbands
than their Norwegian counterparts. Transit data may reveal the difficulties of traveling
from one locale to another, but a lack of trips made suggests a complete absence of
mobility that must be interrogated.
The framework I consult is from Kaufmann’s (2002) concept of motility, which
encompasses a focus on interactions, structures, and contexts as a way to provide a more
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holistic view of what makes a person mobile or immobile. He defines motility as “a way
in which an individual appropriates what is possible in the domain of mobility and puts
this potential to use for his or her activities” (p. 37). This potential may or may not be
transformed into travel. Kaufmann later expanded in Flamm & Kaufmann (2006), which
outlines three determining factors shaping the mobility levels and patterns of an
individual:
1) Access to mobility scapes (representing transport and communication
infrastructure as potential opportunities) including both the availability and the
usability (such as the price level, schedule, etc) of these;
2) Skills: referring to the `skills and abilities' necessary to use the accessible mobility
scapes;
3) Appropriation, meaning behavioral components, such as the need and willingness
to make use of the aforementioned scapes and skills.
The first aspect of motility asks the most basic of questions of being
mobile: do the vehicles to transport people exist? Aggregate travel data, used in
traditional city transport studies address mobility with this question alone (Shaw &
Wang, 2000). Flamm & Kaufmann (2006) not only ask if public transit structures are
available on a map, but if people have access to various other mobility resources. For
example, the most common access right is a privately owned automobile. Beyond that,
the authors consider rights to parking spaces which render the private vehicle useful or a
burden; privately owned “light” vehicles such as motorcycles, mopeds, scooters, and
bicycles; membership in an individual public transport company such as day-long on-thego car or scooter rentals; and public transit passes to specific geographic zones.
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If this transport does exist and users have access to it, one must consider if it is
effective in getting people where they need to go. Blumenberg & Manville (2004) argued
that although SMH has merit, policymakers must move beyond conventional notions that
public transit is necessarily the solution to meet transportation needs of low-income
people. Fixed-route transit often does not successfully move people outside of city
centers, as they mean long commutes that often do not get the riders close to their
destinations (Garasky, et al., 2006; Blumenberg, 2008; Bose, 2014). While improvements
in public transit such as buses are not a detriment to low-wage immigrants and refugees,
they may not be the most efficient and appropriate mode as traditional spatial mismatch
frameworks have suggested. Overwhelmingly, the literature suggests private
transportation as the most viable solution to low-income immigrants in addressing spatial
mismatch. This is particularly applicable to non-city centers and in smaller cities with
sparse transit networks; Blumenberg & Smart (2010) assert while transit may function
well in dense urban centers, many trips in transit-limited locations are better suited to
travel by car. For instance, in rural Iowa, Garasky, et al. (2006) found fixed-route public
transportation was not cost effective, and “incentives for organizing vanpools,
carpooling, or car sharing should be explored” (p. 84). Fan (2012) suggests, as well,
private transit is the most viable solution because low-income populations travel outside
of standard commuting hours for job search and work and face greater family caregiving
obligations than higher-income groups.
Besides the structural aspects and access to transit as a primary factor in mobility,
the skills that refugees have in order to navigate such transit has great impact on their
success. These skills can be described as human capital, or the skills and knowledge that
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an individual acquires and uses for future returns (Coleman, 1990). Flamm & Kauffmann
(2006) delve into the varied aptitudes one requires to access mobility aside from owning
a driver’s license and having learned how to drive. These considerations are: acquired
experience behind the wheel, as novice drivers are considered to need 30,000 kilometers
to be considered experienced with driving an automobile; spatial mastery of the area
through hands-on experience in that particular space and secondary sources such as maps
or verbal directions; skills in timing their travel, such as the capacity to plan an
appropriate timetable for desired travel; knowledge of practical skills such as customs in
transportation spaces, least expensive fare options, mechanical functioning of a vehicle;
and self-control one develops with personal experiences, such as controlling road-rage,
staying focused in frightening situations, ignoring distractions from passengers and other
drivers. The authors stress that learning a master of travel mode requires accumulating
experience over a medium to long-term learning process.
Before an individual can master travel experiences, someone else must teach him
or her how. A great number of skills, such as informal driving lessons or knowledge of
how to swipe a bus pass, are learned from examples of friends and family. Therefore, the
amount of social capital, or the benefits accrued from relationships between individuals
(Coleman, 1990), that a refugee has affects their individual skill levels. While human
capital solely refers to the skills and education an individual possesses, social capital is
always relational, involving social networks and relationships. Evidence suggests that
social capital affects job outcomes positively (Lamba, 2003) and may mediate spatial
mismatch as well. This means the larger a person’s social network, the more likely they
are to find jobs and transport to those jobs.
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To examine this inquiry further, one must consider how immigrant and refugees
use co-ethnic networks to increase their own mobilities. Along with Garasky, et al.
(2006)’s claims that fixed public transport is not suitable for those in poverty, refugees
and immigrants seek to utilize private transport via their own social networks. Social
capital, such as access to carpooling, is a strategy often used by immigrants to increase
mobility. Blumenberg & Smart (2010) discuss how immigrants utilize carpools more than
native-born populations, and they also utilize carpools twelve times as much as they use
public transit. This could be because co-ethnic immigrant networks are tighter-knit than
the much larger general native population. Certainly, as Cvitkovich & Wister (2001) find
in their study of 174 elderly adults in Vancouver, those tapping a larger social network
for rides, including friends and neighbors in addition to family, were significantly more
likely to report fulfilled transportation needs. The importance of social networks on
increasing mobility is more apparent in a smaller city where large co-ethnic networks are
not available to all refugee populations.
Even when skills and social networks are available, a third factor, appropriation,
plays a role in motility. This factor brings human agency into the mobility equation;
while urban structures and absent skillsets limit a person’s usage of transportation modes,
individuals ultimately make the choice to assert mobility or not. Flamm and Kaufmann
(2006) ask: which criteria are people likely to apply when evaluating a particular means
of transportation to satisfy their needs (p. 17)? The authors find people make decisions to
travel based on functionality and safety of the transit mode: does it protect the rider from
weather conditions, accidents/attacks? They also consider individualized appropriations
of what transit means as a social marker. Automobiles or any form of motorized
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transportation can become a status symbol, or for a taxi driver, a professional tool.
Cresswell (2010) notes that human mobility is practiced mobility that is enacted and
experienced through the body, and, therefore, subject to anything the body is feeling at a
given time. When tired, moving can be painful; when forced out of one’s home, mobility
is traumatic. In everyday lived experiences, nuanced individual feelings and behavior
influence mobility.
Lovejoy & Handy (2011) explore the mobility of recent Mexican immigrants in
California who used social networks of friends, co-workers, and neighbors as a
transportation resource. They found that many recent immigrants navigate a complicated
system of favors, both formal (economic) and informal (cooking, cleaning, etc.) Those
who seek rides worry about bothering the people they ask such as neighbors or friends,
and thus sometimes simply choose to stay home despite the fact that transit modes are
available. Immigrants who were uninsured, did not have a license, or were undocumented
experienced fear of being stopped by police, which influenced their decision to take a risk
to become mobile or not. These immigrants had structural access to rides, but they still
sought alternatives due to their lack of comfort and, ultimately, decision to not take the
opportunity.
2.3 Situating Policy and Mobility in a Small City Context
Refugees’ experiences, including their mobility and access to services, hinge on
specific local contexts constituted by labor markets, transportation options, and the
openness of receiving societies to foreigners. These specific facets pertaining to the
locality of Columbia are important to consider as they are in many small cities across the
US with a burgeoning immigrant population. Thus, it is important to ask how smaller
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cities can accommodate refugees and how the characteristics of small cities affect a
refugee’s economic self-sufficiency. Previous literature shows the main advantage of
living in a smaller city is lower cost of living (Drolet & Robertson, 2011; Mott, 2010). In
Mott’s (2010) study, refugees relocated from Chicago and Washington D.C. to
Columbus, OH seeking more affordable housing and lower crime rates. In addition to
these benefits, Drolet & Robertson (2011) find that immigrants and refugees in
Kamloops, British Columbia, Canada move there due to spatial, environmental, and
cultural reasons such as proximity of basic amenities, clean air and surroundings,
friendlier appeal, and pace and lifestyle. Respondents also enjoyed being an intriguing
foreigner in a small city, rather than a face in the crowd in Vancouver, where 45% of the
population is foreign-born.
Conversely, disadvantages to living in smaller cities include issues of mobility,
lack of economic opportunities, lack of services, and lack of diversity. Since most
refugees cannot afford a car and rely on public transportation, their mobility decreases in
smaller cities, which typically have less reliable transportation networks (Bose, 2014;
Edward & Hines-Martin, 2014; Sherrell, et al., 2005). According to Bose (2014),
refugees in Burlington, VT, find the bus schedules fail to accommodate second-and-thirdshift work times. In addition, Bose found 75% of respondents had a job opportunity but
no way to get there. One bus route stops a half a mile short of the medical center, creating
an inconvenient and sometimes impossible gap for those seeking care (Bose, 2014 p.
157). Both Sherrell, et al., (2005) and Mott (2010) find refugee complaints regarding the
lack of economic opportunities for low English proficiency employees. Kosovar refugees
in smaller British Columbia cities lament that they left hometowns with multiple
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manufacturing industries to come to towns too small to provide such opportunities. One
refugee woman in Columbus, OH expressed a desire to relocate because quality jobs
were unavailable, and that she is over-qualified for available jobs (Mott, 2010). Other
refugees struggle with transitioning from agrarian lifestyles to urban ones (Hume &
Hardwick, 2005). These cases suggest not necessarily a complete lack of jobs, but rather
the wrong kinds of jobs due to small cities’ lack of a diverse industrial base.
Other pitfalls of small cities are a lack of English as a Foreign Language
education and lack of spiritual leadership and facilities for non-Judeo-Christian religions
(Drolet & Robertson, 2011). Lack of religious diversity may be especially contentious in
the context of regions that are less accepting of non-Judeo-Christian faiths such as the
U.S. South. Many Southern Christian churches assert narratives that transcend national
boundaries towards welcoming Christian immigrants of various legal statuses and ethnic
backgrounds (albeit through assimilationist perspectives) (Nagel & Ehrkamp, 2016).
There are also multiple religious institutions that provide social services such as English
language training and citizenship classes regardless of a refugee’s religious background.
HIAS, formerly known as the Hebrew International Aid Society, recently launched a slew
of programs that would help to incorporate refugees across cities in North Carolina
(“New Initiatives Aim to Create Welcome for Refugees in North Carolina,” 2015). These
measures of inclusion vary due to the localization of resettlement and size of a given
Southern city; larger cities have a longer history of immigration and therefore acceptance
towards foreign “others”, while smaller cities have had a lack of demographic diversity
until recently.
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However, faith-based independent services tend to benefit Christian refugees
more than others; Mott (2010) cites various incidents in North Carolina that led to clashes
between the Muslim Somali Benadir people and native-born U.S. populations that
eventually caused many in the Somali community to leave. A similar story transpired in a
city within Columbia’s metro area, when a city official protested Somali Bantu
resettlement because they did not feel they “should be the dumping ground" (Goffe,
2004). Due to the lack of a robust Somali or Muslim community, there were few positive
voices to counteract the negativity, which led to out-migration. Finding those of the same
religion is difficult in a smaller city; even more challenging is finding a co-ethnic
network. Refugees in these areas may have experiences with co-ethnic social capital that
differ significantly from the experiences of previous waves of refugees (Hein, 2006) and
thus put more responsibility on VOLAGs to locate employment.
Aside from what refugee needs are or are not met in smaller cities, one must
consider the benefits refugees bring to smaller cities. Refugees’ social service needs do
not exclude them from being part of a conscious economic strategy in some smaller cities
experiencing population decline. Hyndman, et al. (2006) discuss the narratives
surrounding refugees and their potential to benefit city economies. While European
governments conceptualize refugees and asylees as a “share-the-burden proposition”,
Canada and some U.S. cities have shifted the narrative to a “share-the-wealth
opportunity” (p. 4-5). Some smaller new immigrant gateway cities that seek increased
capital flows view refugees as an investment of capital that yields returns. A salient
example is Dayton, Ohio’s successful rebranding from a post-industrial wasteland to an
“Immigrant Friendly City” (Welcome Dayton, 2016). Dayton’s mayor has initiated
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community conversations emphasizing the need for growth through immigrants and how
best to welcome these immigrants.
Another rust belt city, Utica, NY (population 58,000), has seen refugees play an
important role in re-growing the population (Singer & Wilson, 2006). There, proponents
of resettlement indicate refugees have revitalized declining neighborhoods by buying and
renovating low-priced vacant housing and revitalizing the city by opening restaurants,
hair salons, grocery stores, coffee shops, and places of worship. They have filled
previously empty jobs at a local medical equipment manufacturer, which now has a
workforce that is nearly half refugees (who are legally able to work, unlike their
undocumented immigrant counterparts). Refugees should not only merit assistance based
upon their ability to revitalize economies; but for those who hold refugees to neoliberal
citizenship, they can be an economic asset if properly supported in smaller cities.
2.4 Conclusion
For refugees in smaller cities in the South, successfully navigating the physical
and cultural landscape while striving to become economically self-sufficient is a process
complicated by challenges of mobility on a daily basis. The literature demonstrates that
the welcome refugees receive and the availability of welfare and resources varies widely
across U.S. states. Undoubtedly, states with anti-refugee sentiment as well as smaller
cities with limited transport options make it substantially more difficult for refugees to
thrive, and yet the goals and guidelines for economic self-sufficiency are standardized at
the federal level. My study provides an opportunity to explore this terrain and question
the capacity of a small Southern city such as Columbia, SC to incorporate foreign
“others”.
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My research seeks to illuminate the experiences refugees have in this increasingly
common new resettlement context using an expanded definition of mobility to examine
the hindrances to resettlement success. Further, I seek to interrogate what the various
definitions of “success” look like at multiple scales and how federal-level policymakers,
service providers, and refugees themselves work towards reaching their goals. The
question then becomes what the government’s expectations of this population are and
how refugees attempt to fulfill those expectations. My first research question asks: how
does the scale at which policies are made and enforced affect the efficacy of service
delivery? My second research question is: to what extent do the spatial locations of
refugee resources and services such as public transportation, English language training,
and healthcare influence usage and access in Columbia? And finally, what techniques
must refugees utilize in order to resolve the various mismatches they might experience?
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
This research examines refugee resettlement in the context of a small city and
connects federal resettlement policy with city-level refugee livelihoods. To begin to
understand the complexities of refugees’ everyday lives in Columbia, one must start by
examining the services, rules, and regulations set for them on the federal level. First, I
ask: how does the scale at which policies are made and enforced affect the efficacy of
delivery of service (both from the perspectives of service providers and refugees)?
Moving within a vertical scale from top to bottom, I then examine Lutheran Services
Carolina’s position as an intermediary between the federal and state governments and
refugees, asking, to what extent do refugees, service providers, and the state share the
same vision of “successful” refugee resettlement?
After discussing the written policies, I move to how these policies take shape in
everyday life and how they create particular spatialities. My second set of questions thus
asks: to what extent and in what ways do the spatial locations of refugee resources and
services such as public transportation, English language training, and healthcare influence
usage and access in Columbia, SC? As a casual observer, I noted that spatial distance and
a lack of ability to traverse it was the most common barrier to “economic selfsufficiency” that the U.S. government and refugees themselves seek. Within that
question, I want to know: to what extent are refugee housing locations and refugee
services spatially matched or mismatched, if at all? Can the theory of Spatial Mismatch
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be applied in this city context with this refugee population? I dive further into questions
of spatiality by looking at how refugees are able to traverse this space over time. What
are the various hindrances to refugee mobility that influence an individual refugee’s
access to services and ability to meet self-sufficiency goals and how do they overcome
challenges? Ending at the most local scale of the individual, I see how a person’s access
to transit, skills, and social capital affect their mobility and, ultimately, quality of life.
Approach
My study is a qualitative mixed-methods investigation involving participant
observation, interviews, and data mapping (Clark & Cresswell, 2011). I conducted this
study in two parts: Part 1 entailed data collection through participant observation,
interviews, sketch mapping, travel diaries, and document analysis, conducted Fall 2015;
Part 2 was the qualitative Geographic Information Systems (GIS)-based spatial data
analysis of refugee service providers and refugee housing areas also enhanced by
participant observation, completed Spring 2016. Engaging in qualitative GIS allows me
to go beyond conventional analysis of aggregate-level data that foregrounds spatial
location and accessibility. Kwan (2013) states that although these traditional
measurements of space and distance are valuable, scholars must also account for time,
human mobility, and barriers to accessibility. Further, Shaw & Wang (2000) assert that
understandings of individuals’ travel behavior using aggregate models is limited, as those
models focus on more static demographics. For example, conventional four-step urban
travel demand models developed in the 1950s utilize land use, demographic data, and
socioeconomic data aggregated to the traffic analysis zones to estimate the amount of
traffic in each zone. Although aggregate data is easier and less expensive to collect, it
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ignores the realities of changing transportation services and everyday travel experiences.
Rather than focusing solely on structural aspects of public transportation, I sought to
explore the varied factors that lead to refugees’ mobility or immobility. Therefore, I
utilized individualized accounts of travel through sketch mapping during interviews and
travel data that showed where refugees went on a daily basis and how long it took them
to get there. I then incorporated this spatio-temporal data into a GIS to reveal the
difference in travel scope for car versus non-car owners and the weekly travel paths and
the time each trip takes.
The qualitative portion of my study is a basic interpretive study focusing on how
participants make meaning of a situation, in this case resettlement in Columbia, SC. Basic
interpretive studies utilize an inductive strategy, which calls for collecting data such as
interviews and document analysis and then identifying patterns or common themes
(Merriam, 2002). Borrowing from Uteng (2009), in my data collection I sought to explore
what travel maps do not show, such as trips that were not made due to constraining
factors beyond limited bus lines. I explored the reasons behind these trips or staying at
home in order to provide a more comprehensive view of what refugees’ daily experiences
are. This form of study allowed me to provide a rich descriptive account of the everyday
lived experiences of refugees in Columbia and thus uncover the interrelated nature of
barriers to access.
Because I am coming from a qualitative geography background, I assume that
place shapes and mediates social action (DeLyser, 2010). Characteristics of Columbia
such as spatial size, historical development, and locations of services constitute the
spatial context in which refugees develop livelihood strategies. This study focuses on
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service access and mobility of refugee populations as a whole and does not examine a
particular ethnic community; although prior studies have found characteristics such as
gender, education level, and national origin influence an individual refugee’s resettlement
experience (Potocky-Tripodi, 2004), these characteristics are not the focus of my study,
but my research is sensitive to differences among these axes. I wanted to hear the
experiences of refugee populations across these lines and, rather than compare between
them, take the whole of their experiences to comment on the provision of services and
mobility. Drawing from individualized data, this research focus aims to produce practical
recommendations regarding how to adjust federal and city-level structures and services to
better accommodate refugees regardless of their individual characteristics.
Site selection
Many studies have focused on immigrant and refugee transitions to the US are set
in larger cities; however, refugees in smaller cities have distinctive experiences
(Hyndman, et al., 2006; Drolet & Robertson, 2011; Bose, 2014) which greatly influence
my site selection. Smaller metro areas have been faced with the task of incorporating
refugees in accordance with federal demands (as opposed to historical resettlement,
which resettled refugees in smaller cities willingly through independent faith-based
agencies). The selection of Columbia was largely influenced by Patton’s (1990) strategy
of critical case sampling. Critical case sampling shows one case may be applicable to
other cases, and provides observations that can be investigated in similar locales.
Columbia, a smaller city with a variety of structural issues for refugee service access,
may produce results that are applicable to other smaller cities, especially similarly sized
cities within the South. Columbia’s status as a new immigrant gateway in the South
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makes it a representable site that aligns perfectly with my study site criteria.
Columbia has many qualities that make it an ideal study site for exploring refugee
resettlement and mobility in smaller metropolitan areas. The American South is a
particularly interesting site to explore the experiences of minorities due to its history of
slavery, de jure racial segregation, and white supremacy (C.R. Nagel, 2013). Race
relations between African Americans and Whites across the US and particularly in the
South remain contentious long after the Civil Rights Acts of 1964; no more salient recent
example stands than the 2015 massacre of nine African American churchgoers in
Charleston, SC committed by a white supremacist and subsequent controversy over
removing the confederate flag from South Carolina’s state capitol. Increasing immigrant
populations over the past few decades have challenged the traditional binary of Black or
White. The Black/White binary was apparent in the 1990 South Carolina census, which
reported the state to be 99% Black or White. By the 2010 census, the population was
reported as 94% Black or White, and 5.3% Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census Bureau,
2000; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Latino immigration has become more pronounced due
to the increase of low-skill farmworker and manufacturing jobs (because of low tax rates
for companies) across rural South Carolina. Refugees add to this diversifying context and
challenge the current narrative that foreigner equals Latino (Winders, 2006). Winders
suggests refugees “encounter a racial and cultural terrain whose contours are not
equipped to include [them] and whose transformations to accommodate Latino/as may
still leave refugees somewhere outside the boundaries of community” (431).
Recent local controversy surrounding refugee resettlement in both Columbia and
the Upstate of South Carolina highlights on-going resistance to racial and cultural
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differences among some in the South. Despite protest, the number of refugees resettled
by Lutheran Services Carolina (LSC), the only VOLAG in Columbia to serve refugees,
has been steadily increasing and receiving refugees from diversifying regions of origin.
In 2015, LSC received 160 newly arrived refugees, and in the upcoming fiscal year have
been approved to receive 200 (this number may rise slightly with President Obama’s plan
to accept 10,000 additional Syrian refugees). LSC caseworkers work to arrange housing,
facilitate access to social services and public benefits, arrange health screenings and
immunizations, and assist with school enrollment. They also offer educational classes
that address local cultural norms and job development, and provides ongoing support for
employment skills by helping with job placement, job upgrade support, interpretation
support, and employment and skills trainings.
3.2 Data Collection
Part of the evidence for this thesis comes from extensive participant observation
thru my position as a volunteer with refugees in the community. I conducted interviews
with both refugees and the service providers who interact with them. The majority of
service provider interviews were conducted before refugee interviews, as they provided
an overview of resettlement in Columbia. Although the interviews were not extremely indepth, they guided the investigation I then supplemented with my enormous breadth of
direct observation and innumerable informal conversations over the course of a year. I
also collected pertinent documents such as federal guidelines for resettlement,
paperwork/guides refugees receive upon arrival from service providers, and bus route
schedules to which I refer in this thesis.
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Participant Observation
I first became involved as a general volunteer with LSC and later transitioned to a
weekly employment readiness class teacher. From June to December 2015, I volunteered
over 100 hours providing childcare, driving clients to and from doctor and social service
appointments, filing paperwork, delivering mail and documents to clients, and teaching.
Not only did this intensive volunteering help gain the trust of LSC staff and refugee
clients, but by becoming engrained in the structure, I was able to observe how refugee
resettlement workers function organizationally and the messages they seek to deliver. In
January 2016, I launched a refugee gardening program at the University of South
Carolina to provide a space for refugees to grow their own food and practice English in a
safe, community-engaged environment. On average, I spent 20 hours a month with
refugee participants. I experienced firsthand the rewards and challenges of being a
service provider to refugees (personally driving them 60 miles a week for the gardening
project), and conducted further informal interviews with participants I came into contact
with. I estimate that I have met over 100 refugees in Columbia and have become a
recognizable figure throughout the refugee community.
Refugee Interviews
Similar to my site selection strategy, I used critical case sampling to obtain
refugee research participants. Four of the ten interviewees were suggested by
caseworkers at Lutheran Services Carolina. Another four participants were refugees I had
met directly through volunteering, and I met the two remaining participants after asking
previous interviewees if they knew anybody who would like to talk with me. I was
explicit in telling LSC I wanted a wide range of opinions from various nationalities from
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both men and women. In some cases, the caseworkers forewarned me that certain
participants may not have many good things to say, and they were transparent in
providing more than just ‘exemplary’ cases. Due to a lack of available translators, my
participants were limited to those who were conversant enough in English to answer
interview questions or had a spouse who was able to translate. Government cash
assistance is usually available for the first 3 months and in emergency situations up to 6
months post-arrival, and Medicaid benefits are available for the first 8 months postarrival. For this reason, I interviewed refugees who had lived in Columbia from a period
of 6 months to a 1 year and 2 months (with an average of 10.5 months), and thus were
able to recall and contrast life with more government support versus without. For
individual details of each interviewee, see Table 3.1, Refugee Interviewee Demographics.
Table 3.1, Refugee Interviewee Demographics
Code

F/M

Origin/Ethnicity

Car

Months

R1

F

Eritrean

N

14

R2

M

Eritrean

Y

14

R3

M

Iraqi

Y

14

R4

F

Rohingya

N

6

R5

M

Rohingya

N

6

R6

F

Congolese

N

9.5

R7

M

Karen

Y

9.5

R8

F

Karen

Y

9.5
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R9

F

Chin

Y

11

R10

M

Chin

Y

11

Although all refugees are individuals who have unique experiences that also vary
by country of origin, their ease of mobility and access to services in Columbia are
generally of similar quality. For example, if one refugee is unable to work later shifts due
to limited transit routes and hours of operation, then other refugees in Columbia are likely
to face similar challenges. While I did not do a representative survey, similar themes
arose repeatedly in my observations and informal conversations. I conducted semistructured interviews with ten refugees. I interviewed five women and five men in order
to represent gender equally. Six of the interviewees were husband and wife pairs, which
allowed for valuable contrast within household experiences. My sample represented
nationalities in proportion to resettlement rates in Columbia solely for diversity’s sake.
Although there are no statistics on the exact number of refugees in Columbia due to
outmigration, I used LSC’s resettlement statistics from the 2015 fiscal year, which saw
178 refugees resettled total. The breakdown of nationalities are: 45% Burmese1 (81),16%
Eritrean (29), 14% Congolese (26), 22% Near East including Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran,
Pakistan, Bhutan, and Egypt (39), and 0.01% Cubans (3). Thus, my sample consisted of
two Eritrean, one Iraqi, one Congolese, and six refugees originally from Myanmar. Those
resettled from Myanmar are an especially heterogeneous ethnic group; I interviewed

1

This label refers to people originally from the nation of Burma, now known as
Myanmar. “Burmese” often refers to the ethnic majority of the government, which served
to violently oppress the numerous ethnic minorities. My participants do not identify as
“Burmese”, but rather as their own specific language and ethnic groups, in this case,
Karen, Chin, and Rohingya.
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Karen, Chin, and Rohingya refugees from Myanmar with religious affiliations of
Christian, Muslim, and Buddhist. Six participants had a car and four did not.
Formal interviews ranged from 25 minutes to 1.5 hours (on average, 40 minutes).
My interview questions addressed:
1. Locations: Where they go on a regular basis (to be drawn on a map); how spatial
distance and other barriers influence location choice; where they find to be the
most important locations to get to; the distance they usually walk to arrive at
locations;
2. Mobility: How they get around and participate in transit; what experiences they
have had on public transit and how it has influenced their decision to ride
subsequently; what access to private transportation they have, if any;
3. Aid: who helps them and in what ways do they help; how they find help
navigating the physical environment and social context; if these relationships are
interpersonal or organizational; what they gain from service providers such as
LSC; what problems remain or are created due to service providers;
4. Challenges: What challenges they face in terms of pursuing economic selfsufficiency, mobility, and general well-being in Columbia; if those challenges
have gotten better or worse since arrival; how they work to overcome those
challenges;
5. Success & Future: What refugees envision as successful resettlement and what
could help in their goals; what their current goals are and how they are attempting
to reach them; whether or not they view integration into Columbia versus
repatriation as a goal
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During each interview, I employed sketch mapping in order to illuminate
individual-level narratives and real-world aspects of job/service access such as how
transit service affects job choice (Boschmann & Cubbon, 2014). Using Google Earth
software, I designed and printed a 2.5’ x 3.5’ map of Columbia. I added locations I knew
were already important (such as: Lutheran Services Carolina, apartment complexes where
the majority of resettled refugees are placed in Columbia, grocery stores, libraries, etc.)
and frequently serviced bus routes. I asked respondents to indicate where they work, live,
shop, seek resources, and, in combination with city data on fixed bus routes as a guide,
mark which bus routes they take (if any). I then used sticky notes to write the name of the
place they go, stick it in the location, and take multiple pictures of each map. In addition
to providing meaningful spatial location and transit data that I later entered into a GIS,
sketch mapping was a helpful supplement in improving conversation and dialogue.
In addition to interviews and sketch mapping, I asked participants who used
public transit to keep a travel diary over the period of one week. Borrowing from
Rogalsky’s (2010) methodology, I asked respondents to record the origin and destination
location as well as the start and end times, purpose of travel, and mode. Their answers
provided insight far beyond what census-level data or even widespread surveys could tell
me about travel data: it showed the temporal restrictions of when they can access certain
locations, how long it takes them to arrive there, and how those factors affected their
travel plans. When respondents finished their diaries, I followed up with each participant
to discuss the diary, address any gaps in the data, and find out how representative the
trips are of a “normal” week or if they have any additional out-of-the-ordinary trips. I
wanted these diaries to show how a person got around without a car, so I was limited to
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four participants. Of the four, one participant was not literate in English and could not
write a diary, and one declined because she never leaves her house. For these reasons, I
ended up obtaining only two diaries, both of which served to highlight an individual
refugee’s travel path in Columbia.
Refugee Service Providers
In the case of refugee service providers, I used snowball/chain sampling to find
out who is involved in the network of refugee services. Patton (1990) notes snowball or
chain sampling “identifies cases of interest from sampling people who know people who
know people who know what cases are information rich” (p. 243). Through this method, I
determined who works directly with refugees, who might be actively shaping refugee
experiences, and who could share knowledgeable insight into refugee experiences. I
obtained many suggestions from LSC caseworkers, and the health service workers also
gave suggestions of who worked most directly with refugees. I met some interviewees
through events such as World Refugee Day celebrations and Quarterly Refugee
Stakeholders meetings, hosted by the Department of Social Services. My parameters
were to find service providers who had worked/volunteered in their respective positions
in Columbia for at least a year. In the end, only one of my service provider interviewees
had worked for just one year, but the remainder had worked in their positions for 4-7
years (for more details on service provider jobs and length of stay, see Table 3.2, Service
Provider Interviewee Demographics).
I interviewed six individuals in varied refugee service industries, including: two
healthcare providers, one health center coordinator, an LSC caseworker, a Department of
Social Services refugee services representative, and a pair of volunteers affiliated with a
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Table 3.2, Service Provider Interviewee Demographics

Code

Job

Length at Job

SP1

Health Center Coordinator

5+ years

SP2

Volunteer English Teachers

1 year

SP3

Lutheran Services Caseworker

4 years

SP4

Clinical Research Coordinator

7 years

SP5

Refugee Immunization Nurse

6 years

SP6

DSS Ref. Resettlement Program Coordinator 4 years

local church. My questions sought to build a picture of the extensiveness and quality of
services provided for refugees in Columbia. Most of these interviews were conducted
prior to my interviews with refugees, which provided a clear contrast between service
provider versus refugee responses. The questions I asked service providers were similar
to the refugee questions and revolved around the following themes:
1. Locations: Where refugees go and how spatial distance influences choice; where
they expect refugees to go; how far they expect refugees to walk to certain
locations;
2. Mobility: What they have observed in terms of challenges to refugee physical
mobility; How they see refugees mobilize and how they work to increase mobility;
how they have worked with local transit agencies to increase mobility; time spent
3. Aid: How their organization helps refugees and other refugees help each other;
what services they believe help refugees the most; how they consider relationships
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with refugees, as either interpersonal or strictly professional; what documents they
distribute to refugees in order to help them;
4. Challenges: What challenges their organization and refugees face; how both
groups work to overcome these challenges; if the challenges they face improve or
worsen each year;
5. Success: What they envision as successful resettlement and what they think they
do to help; what they prioritize as the most important goal; how the state’s
expectations shape their goals and services offered; if they aim to permanently
integrate refugees into Columbia versus repatriate to country of origin.

These questions drew out responses that showed both what service providers see
firsthand from their organizational side and their conceptions of the challenges refugees
face. In keeping with identical themes between refugee and service provider interviews, I
was able to contrast and compare what service providers sought to provide, the success or
failure of those provisions in their opinions, and the expectations/ actual success of
service delivery from refugees’ perspectives. They also provided a vast amount of
background information that helped to guide later refugee interviews and that shed light
on service providers’ understandings of their clients’ daily lives.
3.3 Data Analysis
I began my analysis by conducting semi-structured interviews with people I
identified as being involved with Columbia’s refugee population. I utilized NVivo
Qualitative Data Analysis software to thematically code my interviews. I observed the
most frequently used terms and issues that refugees and service providers identified as
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challenges and successes. In my analysis of these interviews, I examined the difference
between refugee and service provider respondent answers in terms of their aims,
intentions, and perceptions of resettlement. I compared how these groups, along with the
federal and state governments, prioritize goals for resettlement, which has implications
for how they work towards those goals. These discrepancies further serve to highlight the
fragmented nature of policy and practice at the national, state, and city-scale.
In addition to interviews, I analyzed various documents: for example, the
paperwork/guides refugees receive upon arrival from service providers; any government
documents that refugees are required to fill out; and bus route schedules. As a volunteer
Employment Readiness class teacher at LSC, I not only observed the weekly reminders
and lesson plans refugees heard, but I was assigned the task of delivering them myself. In
order to gauge the usefulness of the given information, I asked: what languages are the
documents in? Are they clearly printed and in color? Is the text layout and format
accessible or discouraging? By examining these documents, I learned what role voluntary
agencies play in integrating refugees into Columbia. Close reading of the content and
structuring of the documents also sheds light on what the state and Lutheran Services
Carolina perceive to be the most important information for refugees to have in order to
function in Columbia. I examined the information that was actually available and how
refugees receive that information, revealing how Lutheran Services Carolina attempts to
fulfill state mandates and direct refugees to what they consider to be successful
integration.
Through sketch mapping and participant diaries, I collected address locations that
refugees access and divided responses into a “Cars” group (6 participants) and “No Cars”
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group (4 participants). I then separated responses into six categories: 1) Live (two
apartment complexes near each other where the majority of refugees in Columbia live);
2) Work (specific locations of interviewed refugees’ jobs); 3) Worship (mosques, Islamic
centers, Christian centers, Greek Orthodox church); 4) Shop (main grocery stores and
specialty ethnic shops), 5) Social/Medical Services (Lutheran Services Carolina;
Hospitals, Clinics, Pediatric Centers) and 6) Leisure (Parks, arcades, and arrows
indicating out-of-town locations). I then geocoded these spatial locations (slightly
modifying residential addresses for privacy) and produced a “Cars” map and “No Cars”
map. In comparing these two maps, it becomes more apparent how a car affects both the
number of locations refugees are able to go to, the extent of their travel distance, and the
types of activities they are able to access.
Researcher Reflexivity
Various personal and professional experiences have led me to this research. I
taught English abroad for four years, and initially did not know the national languages or
how to navigate the country-specific systems (of healthcare, transit, education, etc.).
However, I recognize how much more difficult my experience would have been if I were
disadvantaged, in poverty, lacking racial privilege, and having faced recent trauma from
forced migration. The years I spent teaching English have improved my visual
communication skills with people who have limited English proficiency; I feel at ease
and patient in these instances. In the US, I lived in Columbia, Missouri (population
around 100,000) without a car and experienced difficulties using public transit in a
smaller city. There I also volunteered with Refugee Services and drove refugees to
doctors and social service appointments and witnessed firsthand the mismatch between
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services for refugees, public transit, and refugee housing sectors. My positionality as a
White middle-class educated female working with disadvantaged populations plays into
an inherent power structure of researcher/researched. Further, my engrained position with
my study population as teacher and garden program coordinator always positioned me as
in charge or more knowledgeable than participants. Throughout my program activities
and research, I always aimed to allow refugees maximum agency; in the garden, I asked
them to show me how they do it rather than telling them how. When discussing English
or American job customs, I asked what they did in their country and how they feel about
adjusting to American life. I always brought food or gifts for my interviewees, and I try
to keep in touch to ask how they are doing or deliver donated items. Although inherent
power dynamics cannot be controlled, I tried to use my unique and empathetic
perspective to hear and respect the voices and narratives of participants in my study.
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CHAPTER 4: THE STATE AND SCALES OF SUCCESS
“Lutheran don’t know. We are weak. We are weak when we [come] here. We
don’t have any power. We are like the blind. I need someone to take my hand and
talk with me, “this your way. This right way, and this wrong way”. The Lutheran,
they [don’t] take us to the right way.” -Interviewee R3
The federal government’s requirements, regulations, and demands of refugee
resettlement hinder the local voluntary agency’s (VOLAG) ability to integrate refugees
into local labor markets and institutions. Enforcement of state objectives without regard
to local context or to refugees’ lives affects VOLAGs’ relationships with refugees and
ultimately degrades quality of service provision. Wolch’s (1990) concept of the shadow
state examines how drastic welfare state cutbacks became a central factor in determining
how voluntary agencies function. The federal government’s formalization of existing
networks of faith-based refugee resettlement VOLAGs in the 1980s changed the way
these agencies deliver services by redefining their purpose; instead of aspiring to provide
general aid and assistance, federal guidelines suggested more outcome-oriented goals,
placing economic self-sufficiency at the forefront. Trudeau’s (2008) relational view of
the shadow state, which conceptualizes nonprofits as liminal spaces between the
government and civil society, suggests that nonprofits are able to influence state policy.
In the context of South Carolina, however, the local refugee resettlement agency
Lutheran Services Carolina (LSC) wields little power to impact regulations because of
the way their own “success” is measured, as well as because of chronic underfunding,
and a hostile, unsupportive government at the state level.
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To examine these power relationships, Wolch (1990) calls for a “deconstruction
of local structure, institutional process, and individual routines, and also the ways in
which social structures, institutions and agents operating at higher spatial scales
simultaneously impact local situations” (p. 33). I examine the multiple scales at which
regulations are made and how, at various scales, actors implement different definitions of
successful refugee resettlement. Human geographers draw upon varied definitions of
scale ranging from the horizontal, which concerns transnational networks that span space
and territorial boundaries, to vertical relations, which refer to nested territorially defined
political entities (Leitner, 2004). For the purposes of this thesis, I utilize the latter
definition that considers levels of authority that are hierarchically organized across space.
While the theory of fixed hierarchical scales can oversimplify the socio-territorial reallife complications that exist, hierarchical divisions of scale help to contextualize how
institutional directives shape everyday experiences. Power operates from the top-down,
starting with the federal government, to states, then to VOLAGs, and finally to
individuals. Additionally, over time actors at the institutional level have created
Columbia’s racially polarized urban environment that continues to influence everyday
life at the local scale.
4.1 The Federal: National Refugee Resettlement
Although the 1996 U.S. welfare reform scaled back social services for noncitizens, the federal government does still fund a range of basic services for newly arrived
refugees (Wasem, 2014). Monies are awarded to VOLAGS in order to aid in resettlement
through a federal 90-day (3 month) program called Reception and Placement (R&P).
These services include: picking refugees up at the airport; giving cash assistance from
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federal government; providing housing and basic necessities; helping them access public
benefits such as food stamps, Medicaid, social security; aiding in school enrollment;
providing cultural orientation and employment classes; basic case management assistance
which focuses on setting up doctor’s appointments, initial health screening, and the first
round of immunizations (which must be administered as soon as possible to guarantee all
rounds can be completed within the eight-month period a client has Medicaid).
VOLAGs are also able to apply for another federal resettlement program called
Matching Grant (MG). Codified by the Refugee Act of 1980, MG is an up to 6-month
program focused on refugee self-sufficiency to help them avoid utilizing public
assistance. It offers more benefits, but also imposes more limitations for the client. The
refugee “client” must agree to live in their particular state for 6 months; enroll in the MG
program within 31 days of receiving notice of eligibility; have one employable member
in the family unit; and accept the first appropriate job he or she is offered. Unlike
refugees who are enrolled only in the R&P program, MG clients may apply for additional
emergency cash assistance after their initial 3-month benefit period for an additional 3
months. Cash assistance is more heavily front-loaded and tapers throughout the 6-month
period; once a member of the family unit earns a job, however, the cash assistance
monies decrease gradually. Although ideally the aim is to encourage refugees to earn jobs
and save the federal government money, the contradictory waning of cash funds after
they earn a job gives little to no impetus to become employed within the first six months.
The federal government and the Office of Refugee Resettlement are clear in their
emphasis on self-sufficiency by including the term on the front pages of their websites
and official documents. They also require meticulously recorded deliverable numbers that
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express how many employable refugees obtained jobs in what amount of time. Any
refugee who is resettled in the area and moves out of the state counts against LSC’s “selfsufficiency” percentage, which has hovered around 80% in recent years. LSC reports
these statistics about R&P and MG directly to Lutheran Immigration & Refugee Services
(LIRS), who then reports it to the federal government.
While the government sets a clear outcome-oriented agenda, they are less direct in
providing guidelines for how the resettlement process should look. Interviewee SP3, a
caseworker at LSC, identified the “Operational guidance” document as the main protocol
for refugee arrivals (U.S. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 2007). Last
updated in 2007, this vague 4-page document intends to describe the minimum standards
VOLAGs must follow for the R&P program. It addresses housing standards, furnishings,
and food/clothing required upon a refugee’s arrival. It also notes health screenings and
immunization requirements. The guide suggests VOLAGs should conduct a home visit
and complete health screenings within 30 days of a refugee’s arrival; evidently more
pressing, however, is referring refugees to employment services and EFL within 10
working days of arrival. The document reads, “the Department of State expects Agencies
to undertake best efforts to ensure that housing for refugees meets locally accepted
standards for health and safety, and that other minimum service standards are met, but
also recognizes that compliance with some aspects of this guidance may not always be
possible” (p. 1). Curiously, there are no further examples about what would make
compliance of guidelines impossible, or any retribution for VOLAGs who do not follow
the protocol. It seems they are not concerned with the conditions on the ground for newly
arrived refugees, only the outcome of self-sufficiency by the end of the 3-month
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resettlement period. In this sense, the federal government’s lack of oversight does not
ensure that refugees are being delivered the services they are owed. Hierarchical controls
are much more strongly applied – arguably only applied – to ensure that refugees obtain
employment and reach economic self-sufficiency as soon as possible. This structural
coercion provides little incentive for VOLAGs to focus on anything other than their
hardline self-sufficiency numbers, which allows lackluster service provision for newly
arrived refugees.
4.2 The State: South Carolina
Aside from working to reach the federal government’s self-sufficiency outcomes,
VOLAGs must also function within statewide constraints. Some resettlement programs
are offered on the individual state level through the Department of Social Services in
addition to the federal government’s direct programs. Within DSS, the Refugee
Resettlement Unit falls within the category of Economic Services Division and funds the
position of state resettlement coordinator plus two aids. LSC has contracts with DSS for
these programs and report statistics to DSS, who then report to the ORR, who then
reports to the federal government. Statistics DSS must report include number of newly
arrived refugees, percentage of refugees that got jobs within 3 months, and the time
period in which refugees completed medical screening. The extra refugee-specific
services the state funds are for extended case management, refugee assistance
employment programs, and unaccompanied alien children (UAC). Some states may offer
more or fewer supplementary programs, so in contrast with aforementioned R&P and
MG programs, LIRS is not involved in these particular types of contracts.
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South Carolina consistently ranks towards the bottom in numerous economic and
educational measures, and the state lacks welfare support even for its native-born
population. This general opposition towards social spending is compounded by the vocal
anti-refugee sentiment that many state leaders express. The possibility of national
VOLAG World Relief branch opening in upstate Spartanburg in 2015 caused much
protest from citizens and leaders alike. Trey Gowdy, Representative of the 4th District of
South Carolina, wrote a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry demanding answers to
accusatory questions that suggested DSS was misappropriating funds and that refugees
were criminals. In it, he requested resettlement in Spartanburg be halted until his
constituents receive answers to the letter and further “be comfortable with the
information provided” (Gowdy, 2015). World Relief opened in mid-2015 and continues
to settle refugees in Spartanburg, none of whom have participated in criminal activity.
As part of a larger national anti-refugee narrative in response to recent terrorist
attacks in Europe, in March 2016, some South Carolina legislators concentrated their
efforts in halting resettlement in the state. The Senate passed a bill that would require
refugees’ sponsors to register them in a DSS database, and hold VOLAGs accountable if
a refugee commits a terrorist or criminal act (Posner, 2016). Although this bill was
ultimately defeated, the support for the bill reflects a less-than-welcoming political
climate towards refugees in the state. Essentially, those involved with resettlement in
South Carolina have spent their limited time and resources explaining themselves for
offering services considered standard and acceptable in most other states. This unfounded
and unnecessary political backlash not only causes more personal stress on refugees, but
inhibits street-level bureaucrats from fulfilling their job duties of service provision.
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Service providers within South Carolina also struggle to serve refugee populations
due to the lack of established infrastructure to accommodate refugees. Although refugees
have been resettled in Columbia since 1992, many state agencies still do not account for
the needs of refugee populations. DSS officially has contracts for refugees to freely
obtain driver’s license training, English as a Foreign Language services, and classes at a
local technical college. Refugees must register for these services shortly after they arrive,
but SP3 states that the paperwork often takes so long to process that refugees are no
longer eligible to benefit from these classes by the time they are approved. Many faithbased independent volunteers have valiantly worked to fill in the gaps where the state
fails to provide basic services; two separate churches within walking distance of refugee
apartment complexes have recently begun EFL classes. While it is surely helpful and
much appreciated by refugees, it should be the responsibility of the state to provide
accessible and professionally taught EFL classes from beginner to advanced levels.
Even more basic services, such as public education for refugee children, appear to
be incredibly lacking. Time and time again, refugees I spoke with who arrived as children
reported sitting in classes without understanding English for years, as their schools did
not even offer EFL programs. Another recent example of inept service access is the
trouble state benefits managers have had in filling out forms for the refugees to receive
cash assistance and/or Medicaid status. Because there is no box to check to identify as a
refugee, many people would check “immigrant”, which again, is a status not eligible for
state benefits (B. Grace, personal communication, May 24, 2016). This created an error
within the system, which required added hassle and communication to fix, and ultimately
delayed and shortened the period of time that refugees could access these services.
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Even after Medicaid benefits are officially delivered, LSC struggles to find
doctors’ offices who both accept Medicaid and provide interpretation services. Medical
providers are legally obligated to provide interpretation via a subscription to a language
hotline, but many in South Carolina simply do not. Interviewee SP3 discussed the backand-forth between medical providers and LSC, both insisting the other should be the one
to provide interpretation. Oftentimes LSC, desperate to help their clients see a doctor
after months of trying to schedule an appointment, pays their own contracted interpreters
who are not medically trained to translate. This creates further dependency on LSC every
time a client needs an appointment; rather than direct interaction between a refugee and
the medical provider, LSC strains its time and resources to serve as the intermediary.
Some compliant offices and hospitals offer language lines, yet still many
providers lack “culturally competent healthcare” as Edward & Martin (2014) discuss. I
witnessed this firsthand when I drove a heart patient in for surgery early one morning.
When I explained to the provider that he needed the language line for Rohingya, she
audibly stressed that she had never heard of the language, which served to remind the
patient (and weary South Carolinians in the waiting room) that he was an outsider. It is
not expected for every nurse and doctor to be intimately familiar with refugee languages,
but a shocked demeanor translates well past the language barrier to make refugees feel
unwelcomed. An emergency room visit that an Afghani woman made exemplifies how
medical providers’ cultural incompetency makes a horrifying situation even worse.
Because she was wearing a hijab, the medical staff assumed she spoke Arabic, and
insisted she listen to the language line, which was instructing her in a language more
foreign to her than English. Accommodating the specific needs of refugees calls for a
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heightened level of sensitivity and patience that some caring office staff and doctors do
provide, such one nurse, SP 5, who specializes in setting up and reminding refugees of
their immunization appointments. Still, these few compassionate actors are constantly
working within a system that seems to be pitted against them and their goals of providing
services to refugees.
4.3 The Organizational: Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
Although resettlement policy is implemented through hierarchical levels of scale,
not all of the nine national VOLAGs function in the same way. For example, the
International Rescue Committee (IRC) was founded specifically for the purpose of
responding to humanitarian crises. With a network in over 40 countries and 26 regional
offices across U.S. cities, IRC’s main purpose is to aid refugees in resettlement towards
self-sufficiency (International Rescue Committee, 2016). This is contrasted with the way
that Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services (LIRS) and all faith-based resettlement
agencies such as Catholic Charities and HIAS function. Lutheran Family Services is an
agency that has offered broad family support such as adoption and pregnancy counseling,
older adult and caregiver services, foster care, homeless help, etc. since 1948. Some but
not all of these established agencies now house refugee resettlement programs that are
sub-contractors of LIRS, not independent branch offices specifically for resettlement (as
IRC functions).
The difference may be subtle, but has implications that change the way these
VOLAGs are formed as well as their power dynamics. Instead of the agency forming
where refugees were already living, refugee resettlement through Lutheran services
began in specific cities where there was already an established Lutheran Family Services
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office (B. Grace, personal communication, May 24, 2016). This explains why LIRS tends
to be the only refugee resettlement agency available in smaller cities such as Casper,
Wyoming; Huron, South Dakota; Greeley, Colorado; and Battle Creek, Michigan (See
Figure 3, RY2014 Reception and Placement Program Affiliate Sites). Although LIRS
functions in larger cities across America, its strong geographic dispersal across the
Midwest is related to the history of Lutheran immigrants. It is through these avenues that
refugees have come to resettle in small communities that offer Lutheran services but not
many other forms of support.

Figure 4.1, Fiscal Year 2014 Reception and Placement Program Affiliate Sites. LIRS
(green) appears in smaller cities across the Midwest while IRC (dark blue) has settled
intentionally in cities for easier refugee integration. Source: Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State
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While volunteering with LSC, I viewed firsthand their relationship with LIRS.
LIRS provided many educational materials for employment classes such as PowerPoint
presentations and interactive videos. They asked LSC to report back if they had used the
educational modules in employment class, and if so, how many people attended. While
some of the materials were useful, many were vague theoretical lessons that introduced
confusing acronyms as motivational tools. When I utilized these slides, refugees
expressed confusion (acronyms are not handy for illiterate people who are using
interpreters). The employment developer before me (whose position I filled as a
volunteer after he left LSC) found it important to use these tools and report back to LIRS
to stay in the good graces of LIRS; but as a volunteer who had no motivation to please
anyone except my pupils, I often taught direct and simple lessons that I valued to be
effective. At one point, a LIRS Cultural Orientation Coordinator traveled to Columbia to
get a sense of how their affiliates run things and how they can better aid in program
development. This visit exemplified the non-hierarchical relationship LIRS has with
LSC. It was not for program monitoring, but rather to discuss trainers’ challenges and
best practices. At the same time, however, the LIRS coordinator fully expected job class
to be taught through their specific educational module, showing some degree of control
over LSC’s daily operations. This particular relationship exemplifies LIRS’s broader
relationship with LSC and suggests, again, that the oversight of service delivery matters
little compared to the federal standards of refugees obtaining ‘self-sufficiency’.
4.4 The Local: Lutheran Services Carolina
This incredibly complicated system of federal, state, and organizational directives
materialize at the site of the local – LSC. The deconstruction of institutional processes
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that Wolch calls for reveal what is happening on the ground beyond the government’s
required statistical breakdown of “self-sufficient” cases. By observing at LSC and
interviewing refugees directly, one is able to see the final outcome of this long
bureaucratic process, what LSC is able to deliver, and what refugees expect. Oftentimes
when I taught employment classes, we discussed how America was different from
refugees’ home countries and what they had learned about America previously. As
UNHCR camps train refugees to go to the entire country of America, they certainly do
not cover the discrepancies of service among states. Many refugees commented that their
friends in cities in California and the Pacific Northwest were offered a much wider
network of support via VOLAGs as well as stronger ethnic networks. Those who were
better educated (oftentimes from Egypt, Iraq, and Iran) fled Columbia to join their family
members in other cities. Those with less education often remained, working menial
factory jobs alongside their family members.
One of the main goals LSC sought to deliver during employment classes was to
manage refugees’ expectations. At the beginning of every employment readiness class, I
was required to read a list of welcome announcements as well as program expectations.
After years of seeing refugee hopes dashed, LSC employees found it crucial to provide a
realistic view of what to expect from life in Columbia. Among those realistic facts were:
clients are not “given a job” but LSC puts in 20% of the work at helping them find a job,
and refugees put in 80% of the work; work history and references are important for future
jobs; non-compliance, i.e. not accepting the first job offer a person gets, results in
termination from LSC employment services program; each state has a minimum wage
and refugees can expect $8 - $12 per hour; and it is vital to search for jobs straight away.
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One interviewee, R2, was let down not due to his unfairly high expectations, but
his previous experiences in Norway, Sweden, and Malta, where he lived for a total of five
years. He explained that he, as well as many of his friends and family, experienced
superior care in these second-party resettlement countries. The starkest difference
between Norway and the US was the educational opportunities offered. In Norway, the
refugee has a choice throughout his first six months to invest in skills classes such as how
to be a cashier, how to cook, driver’s and CDL license, et cetera. Interviewee R2 claims
not even a six-month period is necessary, but even three months could make a huge
difference in preparing a refugee for more highly skilled labor. He shares:
“In these 3 months, when you give him some course, you can change his life. But
when he’s coming the refugee, you take him, you put him in the chicken or
vegetable [factory]…you know, you kill him. For [the] future, this person is
nothing. He don’t learn nothing… They just get his money, he pay for rent, he eat,
he drink, that’s it. We don’t have nothing. They don’t have nothing, you know.”
Poignantly stated, Interviewee R2 identified the flaws with the current U.S.
resettlement system focused on self-sufficiency. Although these directives are set by the
U.S. government, this refugee client expressed frustration with LSC directly for their
insistence on early employment. This lamentation against the extreme focus on getting a
job instead of learning English was common. Many times employment readiness pupils
asked how it was possible to get a job before learning English. LSC employees explain
that is just the way it is and they must do both at the same time. This aligns with
Trudeau’s (2008) research showing the ORR reprimanded a local non-profit for placing
refugees in EFL class that met during the day (because they should be free during the day
for work).
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Interviewee R1, an Eritrean woman, has three children in Ethiopia whom she left
behind nine years ago to lay the foundation for family reunification in the US.
Understandably, her main focus is working enough hours to send remittances to her
children, and to begin the bureaucratic process to bring them here. She realizes that she
needs to increase her English proficiency to get a better job, or even a second job, in
order to support her children abroad. She commented that many of her friends in
Columbia are taking English classes, but she is not. The reason is because she took the
first job opportunity she was offered after a month of living in Columbia, but when she
asked her caseworker about English class, she was told registration was closed and she
missed the deadline for classes. She was one of many refugees who told me about
missing the deadline or not having time to attend class at Richland One Education Center,
which is contracted by DSS to provide free EFL classes. This service may be technically
available, but it is evidently under-utilized due to its difficulty to obtain.
Another complaint refugees gave regarding their lack of agency involved signing
documents. Because the federal government requires such a well-documented paper trail,
LSC must obtain refugees’ signatures in many different instances such as accepting
matching grant conditions and upon receiving rent checks and cash assistance. As many
refugees are illiterate in their own native languages, it is impossible that every refugee
has full understanding of the documents they are signing. Even with translators
explaining these documents, the Western-bureaucratic nature can be overwhelming and
confusing upon arrival. Interviewee R7 dealt with confusion about the lease for his
family’s apartment unit. His LSC caseworkers told him there was only had a 1-bedroom
apartment available at the time, but that when a 2-bedroom became available his family
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could move. He wanted to see the apartment before signing, but the caseworkers insisted
it was not a problem and he did not need to see that. When the family moved into the
supposed 1-bedroom, they were surprised to see the apartment did not have a complete
full bedroom. Rather it had an upstairs loft, one side of which opened into the downstairs
ten feet below. The couple found this layout to be very unsafe for their two-year-old
daughter who could easily slip through the railing that had foot-wide gaps. He shared
with me his conversation with LSC:
“So I say, I don’t want to stay in this house because it’s not safe for my daughter.
But they say, no choice because you already sign for this. I don’t know that,
actually. I already told them, ‘you already told me if you got 2-bedroom, I can
change. But now you say no.’”
Nine months later, interviewee R7 and his wife were still living in the apartment,
with a makeshift sheet of plywood serving as a cover to prevent their daughter from
slipping through the railing.
Refugees have also complained of being locked into a lease for one year in an
apartment they do not like. One refugee single mother whose five-year-old daughter I
babysat also was dissatisfied with the permanence of the lease she did not realize she was
signing. The apartment carpet emitted a rather strong food odor, and her daughter seemed
to be having congestion and allergic reactions to it. Caseworkers attempted to use carpet
cleaning spray, but it did not make much of a difference. This woman was very unhappy
and said if she had known the problems this unit had, she would not have signed the
lease. But given the conditions for affordable housing, it seems this woman and her child
were not offered much choice. Interviewee R3, a proud father, was upset to find out that
the best schools in the area were in a different suburb than where his family had been
placed. Seeking the best education possible for his children, his plan was to move to this
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suburb as soon as their current lease was up. LSC pre-selects an apartment for a refugee
to occupy before they arrive, and, barring extreme circumstances, expect the refugee to
stay there for the length of their lease.
Oversight of an individual refugee’s personal dignity is not an intentionally cruel
act, but rather, a matter of the VOLAG simply focusing on basic service provision and
nothing more. LSC is so understaffed that even with an outpour of community support in
response to the Syrian refugee crisis, they are not in a position to organize and utilize
volunteer labor efficiently. LSC supports and appreciates volunteers who form their own
programs, but does not have the capacity to take part in such programs. The thin
volunteer safety net is mostly church-based, and is made up of local congregants,
community members, and students from the University of South Carolina. These
dedicated people work to fill in the gaps that formal service delivery failures leave, by
setting up EFL classes in various locations at different times, providing small citizenship
classes, or even ‘adopting’ one family to whom they provide special support. While their
help is invaluable, it is not enough to make up for the structural barriers to service
delivery refugees face. Formal services such as obtaining Medicaid in a timely manner,
providing integrative EFL classes for children in public schools, and giving an option for
re-certification of former jobs cannot be offset to the voluntary sector.
Ideally, LSC would be able to focus on more than just basic services and aim to
create true “success”, the definition of which varies by scale. It is obvious that the federal
and state level policymakers view success as “the refugee no longer uses public money”.
However, to SP 3, the LSC caseworker, successful resettlement is defined as integration
into the community. This integration entails functioning in society in a way that they feel
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comfortable and knowledgeable about their community. To this caseworker, success is
getting past the point of just surviving to the point of focusing on enjoying life and
participating in community events or traveling to explore new cities. Interviewee R4
expressed a similar definition, hoping to tour America someday. She also hoped to own
her own online business selling Malaysian clothes to people in the US. This interviewee,
along with all the other interviewees who did not have cars, commented that their
personal success would be to own a car. Interviewee R1, whose three children are still in
Ethiopia, views success as being able to bring her children to the US and reunite after
nine years. Refugees cannot focus on aiming for success in the future when they are so
focused on getting by in the meantime.
On multiple scales beyond their cramped offices, LSC’s one task is to assure
refugees become economically self-sufficient within 3 months. This is no easy feat even
in a well-supported state, but the complete lack of infrastructure at the state level and the
shortage of largely established ethnic networks leave LSC the only remaining entity to
help newly arrived refugees. Their contracts that focus on self-sufficiency do not account
for the daily tasks that fall into LSC’s lap, such as helping a lost refugee navigate their
way home over the phone, or attending judiciary committee meetings to defend the
concept of refugee resettlement itself. In Columbia, LSC is the safety net who has to
compensate for the shortcomings of state services. This setup is inefficient and strains
resettlement processes as well as client relationships, and brings in refugees who are set
up to struggle.
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CHAPTER 5: HINDRANCES TO MOBILITY
Considering the disjointed and wholly inadequate nature of refugee services and
guidance at various scales, it is unsurprising that what is expected of refugees also varies
widely at each step of the settlement process. Throughout a refugee’s journey towards
third-country resettlement, she experiences conflicting expectations of mobility.
International organizations and temporary resettlement camps prefer migrants remain
within the areas to which they are restricted. The federal government likewise prefers
those who have exerted less agency and mobility (already placed refugees) vs. those who
have exerted more by crossing a border, seeking asylum. Mountz (2011) notes Bosnian
migrants to Canada were “chosen by authorities from the country where they would be
resettled, rather than having chosen mobility themselves, acted upon in a humanitarian
fashion, rather than choosing to exercise their own mobility” (p. 189). The welcome
extended to these refugees contrasted with the treatment Chinese boat people who arrived
uninvited on shore and who were turned away.
The “ideal” refugee citizen is paradoxical; prior to and upon arrival, she is an
agentless, passive body to be placed. Once settled, however, this citizen must mobilize to
meet state demands of self-sufficiency in mere months. Refugees are expected to use
their own agency to forge their own paths with very little support. The only way refugees
can possibly become “economically self-sufficient” within 90 days is by getting a job as
quickly as possible; the only way refugees can get a job is by having access to
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transportation that will bring them there. This is a catch-22: the state wants refugees to
become economically stable through their own volition, yet the tools and infrastructure to
do so simply do not exist. Limited mobility within Columbia is a structural factor that
makes it extremely challenging for refugees to be wholly independent and fulfill both the
government’s and their own goals. By examining this process as it unfolds in Columbia, I
highlight concepts of structure versus agency: how do refugees navigate the structural
constraints that are part of refugee resettlement? To what degree are they able to finally
assert their own agency and mobility with the resources they are given in a small city
such as Columbia?
The framework I use to explore refugee agency is Kaufmann’s (2002) concept of
motility, which encompasses a focus on interactions, structures, and contexts. As
discussed in the literature review, he defines motility as “a way in which an individual
appropriates what is possible in the domain of mobility and puts this potential to use for
his or her activities” (p. 37). This potential may or may not be transformed into travel.
Kaufmann later expanded in Flamm & Kaufmann (2006), which outlines three
determining factors shaping the mobility levels and patterns of an individual:
1) Access to mobility scapes (representing transport and communication
infrastructure as potential opportunities) including both the availability and the
usability (such as the price level, schedule, etc) of these;
2) Skills: referring to the ‘skills and abilities’ necessary to use the accessible
mobility scapes;
3) Appropriation, meaning behavioral components, such as the need and willingness
to make use of the aforementioned scapes and skills.
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5.1 Structure
To understand the structural hindrances to mobility that refugees face, it is
important to examine the setting in which they live. A majority of refugees are resettled
by LSC in the northeast area of Columbia seven miles from downtown, in one of two
apartment complexes located on the same city block, Creek Crossing Apartments and
Pines Place (names changed for anonymity). Creek Crossing, which evokes the feeling of
a safe clearing surrounded by trees, has an open design with 10 2-story apartment
buildings, 8 units per building of 1 and 2-bedroom apartments. Immediately upon
entering, one may be inclined to refer to it as “Little Myanmar”; over half of its residents
are originally from Myanmar and they are often gathered outside, or even perched in one
of the multiple trees present. There are also multiple Eritrean tenants, generally “free
cases” (a single person who is placed randomly in Columbia, as opposed to those who are
placed for family reunification) or families of 2, that hesitantly reside at Creek Crossing;
they do not express contempt towards the majority of refugees from Myanmar, but rather
annoyance towards what they view as a lapse in standards of personal cleanliness.
Although there are grocery stores and gas stations within walking distance, the road the
apartment is on has steep ditches, no sidewalks, and it is extremely hilly and curvy; I am
reminded of drivers’ limited visibility each week I visit. For this reason, many refugees
take a shortcut to the bus stop through the wooded area that presumably belongs to
someone else.
Pines Place offers single-story 2-bedroom and 3-bedroom options, and is, in
general, newer and nicer than Creek Crossing. It has more non-refugee clients, and
contrary to Creek’s open concept, is a winding maze of speed bumps for any driver to
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navigate with a multitude of dead ends. There is a laundry room and playground, but no
central location for large groups to gather. LSC maintains a close relationship with the
apartment offices, as they are in charge of providing the requisite amount of furniture for
newly resettled refugees and delivering rent checks from the federal government for the
first three months. LSC identified these apartment complexes as a good place to resettle
refugees as they are affordable, close to bus lines, and most importantly, are owned by
patient people who understand refugees’ needs. At one apartment complex, a lady who
works in the office oftentimes sits down with refugee tenants and helps them write checks
or helps them understand various bills they have to pay. Interestingly, this particular
apartment complex has long served as housing for newly arrived immigrants. A colleague
whose family emigrated from Southeast Asia in the mid-80s recalls moving to Creek
Crossing where there were many other immigrant families. For whatever reason, this long
To assume Columbia’s urban landscape and sparse public transportation is simply
a product of being a small town would be to ignore the role of social and racial politics
that has left substantial imprints on the landscape. Columbia once had extensive streetcar
services for Whites and, to a lesser extent, Blacks, prior to desegregation. Weyeneth
(2005) discusses the streetcar that ran in a Beltline around the city – clockwise carried
only Blacks, while Whites rode in cars moving counterclockwise. The history of Atlanta
lends explanation to the diminishment of public transit and development of such an autocentric region across the South. Prior to desegregation, public goods such as transit,
parks, recreational spaces such as golf courses and swimming pools were predominantly
utilized by lower and middle class White citizens (upper class Whites utilized private
automobiles and country clubs). Mayor Hartsfield was a prominent civil rights supporter
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and sought to bring peaceful resolution to desegregation, in contrast to white supremacist
narratives of other southern White leaders. Many Whites resisted desegregation, both on
a policy level from city and state leaders who supported White suburbanization and
White individuals who chose to suburbanize themselves. Lower class Whites felt that
“their” space was being encroached upon and essentially boycotted these public
amenities (physically and financially), asserting that they would rather find alternatives
than share with Blacks (Kruse, 2005). As lower class whites realized privatization could
be used to perpetuate racial separation, they invested in private cars. Coined as
“secessionist automobility” (Henderson, 2006), the race-based secession from urban
space and urban ideologies equated urban with Blackness and suburban with a bastion of
modernity and White escape from the encroaching “Other”.
Immigrants and refugees today inherit a landscape shaped by White resistance to
racial integration. It is fascinating to note that the pattern of lower to middle class White
aversion to Others still rings true today, as richer Whites in Columbia seldom have reason
to share spaces with refugees. Not only has White secession affected the public transit
means by which refugees move about the city, but also the actual structure of the city
itself. The city lacks a strong industrial core, social services are disjointed throughout,
there are pockets of poverty interspersed due to section 8 housing, and there is a massive
extent of sprawl that exhibit pathways of White flight. Columbia’s low population
density attests to this sprawl – its population of 133,803 people divided over its 132.2
square miles averages 1,012 people per square mile (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). In
comparison, Atlanta (a large city considered to have considerable sprawl) has 3,360
people per square mile, and Minneapolis has 7,417 per square mile. Low population
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density in Columbia and other smaller cities mean the number of people who seek transit
are fewer and more spread out.
As well, Columbia offers rural manufacturing jobs outside of the suburbs rather
than concentrated industrial opportunities. Ranked as one of the most “business-friendly”
states in the US, South Carolina offers some of the lowest corporate tax income rates in
the nation (5%), highly competitive wages for workers, and low unionization rates (South
Carolina Department of Commerce, 2016). Governor Nikki Haley has intentionally
sought to draw businesses seeking low operating costs to SC, as it levies no state property
tax, no local income tax, no inventory tax, no sales tax on manufacturing equipment,
industrial power, or materials for finished products, no wholesale tax, and no unitary tax
on worldwide profits. It is interesting to contrast these fiscally charitable business tax
rates with the state’s protective stance on tax money when it is spent towards aiding
refugees. This corporate haven has drawn the manufacturing sites of auto companies
BMW and Michelin and well-known food manufacturing corporations of Kraft, Nestle,
Pepperidge Farm, Perdue Farms, and Tyson Foods. This abundance of low-skill jobs has
contributed to the growth of the state’s foreign-born population, drawn undocumented
and documented migrants alike, and provides hard-to-reach opportunities for refugees.
Flamm & Kaufmann’s (2006) examination of structural hindrances to mobility
asks similar questions as Kain’s (1968) Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis. Kain mentions
high automobile costs and long, circuitous or non-existing transit routes as prohibitive of
gainful employment in the inner-city populations he studied in 1950s Chicago and
Detroit. Given the vastly differing layouts between Columbia and Kain’s sites, can
spatial mismatch hypothesis be applied when examining refugees in Columbia?
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Columbia’s refugee population does not have a particular spatial concentration of
“migrant jobs” as did Kain’s African American economic opportunities. Refugee
workplaces in Columbia vary from restaurant jobs in the suburban area around their
homes, USC’s campus near downtown, or vegetable and poultry processing plants in
outlying rural areas (see Figures 1 and 2 for a visualization of refugee home, work, and
service locations). This lack of a clear urban-to-suburban commute means refugee
placement in suburban areas does not make access to jobs any easier, as it would have in
1950s Chicago for African Americans. Along with housing location, measuring distance
as a main prohibitive measure does not provide much explanation for the challenges
faced by Columbia’s refugee populations. Distance is not as important as mode of
transport, in line with Blumenberg’s (2008) conclusion. Blumenberg & Manville (2004)
argued that although the spatial mismatch hypothesis has merit, policymakers must move
beyond conventional notions that public transit is necessarily the solution to meet
transportation needs of low-income people.
This finding is obvious to Columbia’s refugee population; all six non-car-owning
participants said they plan on saving for a car. The six who already have cars made it a
priority to buy a vehicle as soon as they could afford it. The disparity between what
locations refugees have access to with vs. without a car is obvious in the maps below.
Refugees with cars were able to enjoy leisure time and travel to various other cities, while
refugees without cars never participated in leisure activities. The maps show that refugees
take jobs where they can get them regardless of if they have a car or not, but individual
interviews illuminate the hassle and coping strategies that non-car owners must
participate in in order to get to work.
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Figure 5.1, Refugee Frequented Locations in Columbia, SC: Non-Car Owners

Figure 5.2, Refugee Frequented Locations in Columbia, SC: Car Owners
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My research shows that while in general it would be easier if refugees lived closer
to jobs, transit mode rather than distance determines a refugee’s ability to get to a
particular location. If it is beyond walking distance, distance does not matter. Out of ten
interviewees, a woman (R6) who works packaging produce travels farthest to get to work
(15 miles one way). She does not own a car, but the plant provides transportation
specifically for refugee employees. No bus routes that connect her home and the plant
exist, and other interviewees who work at a similar plant without transportation pay
$20/week to carpool with coworkers. Another interviewee works for campus dining at the
University of South Carolina, the largest employer of refugees in the area. The dining
facilities are only 7.5 miles away from her house, but she has no car, nor friends who can
give a ride, so she uses public transit. According to her travel diary, her daily commute is:
5:40am: leaves house, take daughter to daycare
6:02am: catches first bus to bus station
6:32am: catches connecting bus
7:00am-3:30pm: works
3:45pm: walks to bus station
4:45pm: takes bus to daughter’s daycare
5:30pm: pick daughter up and finally,
6:00pm: arrive at home.
She spends an average of 3.5 hours commuting 15 miles, traveling 4 miles per hour. This
time includes walking to and from the bus stop, waiting for undependable buses (that
may add to her commute), and walking slower after picking up her 5-year-old child from
daycare.
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For the first eight months that refugees are eligible for Medicaid, they have the
option of booking free transportation to appointments via the Medicaid van. Newly
arrived refugees have multiple healthcare needs; besides addressing any medical needs
that have been ignored prior to arrival in the U.S., they must go to requisite health
screenings and immunizations that must be spaced out over time. Interviewee SP 2, a
nurse who often helped refugees, discussed the van but mentioned the necessity to speak
English or Spanish to reserve the van. Although this van is technically an option,
caseworkers at LSC claim many refugees would rather find their own way then attempt to
take the Medicaid van. Transportation must be booked via phone more than three days in
advance, which is a challenging feat for Limited English Proficiency clients, especially
considering local Medicaid service providers have less exposure to foreigners than those
in a larger, more diverse city. Many refugees who have managed to book the van find it
terribly unreliable, with negative experiences of being late to their appointments or of the
van never coming at all.
Only six of the ten interviewed participants owned a car (the purchase of which
was aided by family and friends, which I will discuss later). Price is an obvious barrier to
purchasing a private automobile; despite the high cost, all four refugee interviewees
without a car listed it as their most pressing immediate goal. Fan (2012) noted the modal
mismatch of lower socioeconomic status populations; although they are the least likely
group to own cars, they are the most likely to need cars to accommodate nontraditional
work schedules. Refugees understood what a necessity a car is and they make other
financial sacrifices accordingly. Interviewee R5, who lived many years in Malaysia and
sent remittances to his family in Burma, is attempting to save for a car – but as he already
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is not sending as much as he was able to from Malaysia, the choice is between helping his
family eat or saving for a car. Even when refugees have enough for a down payment,
insurance, and monthly payments towards a car, a lack of credit history to obtain loan
often works against them. This is yet another example of needing social networks to aid
in finding sellers who will work out a deal for people with a lack of credit history. Larger
cities with longer established and larger immigrant and refugee networks are likely to
have more credit and car dealership options than a city of Columbia’s size.
Although LSC takes into account bus line access before placing refugees, even
the most connected bus stop locations suffer from long intervals between pick-up times.
Columbia is a sprawling small city that attempts to offer extensive bus lines. This means
that completing a full route takes a long amount of time and most lines offer the
frequency of one bus per hour. Another consequence of longer bus lines is there is more
opportunity for delays from traffic, accidents, lag, etc. Across the board, refugees
reported that buses are often ten to twenty minutes late, and sometimes do not come at all
(although some of these no-show incidents could be explained by a miscommunication
about bus cancellations due to holidays, weather, and other delays). Again, how far away
refugees live does not necessarily affect their ability to get to work. Even if refugees live
closer to their work place, they still only have the opportunity to access transit once per
hour. Many interviewees also discussed having to complete lengthy route loops before
reaching their final destination. Finally, bus service times fail to accommodate refugees
working second and third shift jobs. On weekdays, the last bus pick-up time to make it
home is around 11:30pm; on weekends, it is 8:30pm. Any refugees in the service industry
would likely not be able to catch a bus home after restaurant shifts. Interviewee R5, who
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works in the kitchen of a local Sushi restaurant, takes the bus to work but receives a ride
home from his work friend.
The temporal aspects of Columbia’s public transit options not only inconvenience
refugees in their daily commute to work, but they prohibit refugees from accessing
services offered. The most salient example is English as a Foreign Language (EFL)
classes. Although technically free EFL classes are offered at the adult education center in
the evenings, the time it takes to ride the bus there and back consumes a person’s entire
schedule. These times also overlap with when many refugees are working (second and
third shift times) so it is impossible to attend. Interviewee R6 started taking English
classes when she first arrived, but as soon as she started working (six days a week) she
realized she does not have time to attend.
5.2 Skills
Transit infrastructure available to refugees is of little use if they do not have the
skills required to access it. As many refugees are coming from rural backgrounds, it is
likely that this is the first time they have had to regularly utilize public transit. As
newcomers to the city and technology alike, it is imperative that refugees receive
adequate training showing how to ride the bus. Subtleties that may be obvious to a nativeborn transit user such as which door to enter, how to pay, where to sit, and which stops to
get on and off at are highly intimidating for many refugees. Lutheran Services had
provided bus training via a volunteer who was carless herself and thus knew the ins and
outs of Columbia public transit. When this volunteer left, caseworkers took over training
when they could find time, which led to inconsistent and ultimately undelivered training.
On more than one occasion I witnessed refugees who had been living in Columbia for 2
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weeks to a month asking about their bus training; some were told it would happen soon,
others were told to look for a friend or family member who could show them around. Of
course, due to the government’s strict regulations on finding employment within three
months of arrival, most friends and family were busy at work during the day. This brief
period makes adequate bus training as soon as possible even more valuable, as a month
without knowing how to use the buses translates to less time to search for jobs on foot.
Another component of skills to motility is physical ability: can the person walk
long distances to and from bus stops? One older male refugee who had a prosthetic leg
from the knee down due to amputation walked slowly with a cane. In his late 50s, he was
not old enough to be considered retired and draw social security, so he was required to
search for a job. Even with bus training, the amount of time it took him to use the bus
was excessive and this complication made it impossible for him to find work. A few
months after coming, he left Columbia to join family in Michigan, citing a lack of jobs as
the reason.
If a refugee is trained and physically able to access buses, another skill required is
a basic understanding of English language and literacy. Identifying bus numbers,
understanding route schedules and times, and following instructions of the bus driver are
all necessary to successfully ride the bus. Columbia’s transit offers a useful smartphone
application that tracks the buses in real time; however, those refugees who are fortunate
enough to have a smartphone must also be able to navigate the English-only application
to use it. Another form of mobility that requires English language and literacy is driver’s
license tests. Many refugees said they were working on their English specifically so they
could take the test. One interviewee, R1, laughed when I asked if she had a license,

79

saying of course not, because it requires English to take the test. Another interviewee, R2,
had a driver’s license, but failed the test the first time. He stated, “first time, yeah, I
stopped because I became confused. I was 2 weeks here, I was new, I don’t know
nothing. I go there, I try, and when I try, you know, I said, it’s too difficult.” He then
went home, reviewed the questions and studied for a week, and was able to pass the test
the second time.
Those who speak English fluently enough to pass a written driver’s license test
must then also have the training of how to pass a driving test. Interviewee SP6, who
worked for the Department of Social Services (DSS) under refugee resettlement,
explained that the department contracts certain companies to fulfill driver’s training. DSS
pays for 12 hours of behind-the-wheel training and a road test for refugees, and they are
eligible for this service up to five years after their arrival. Once they apply for the training
with DSS, they technically have a 3-month period to complete the training, although
often this period is shortened due to lengthy paperwork processing times. After DSS
receives their application, they send a letter to the refugee stating where the provider is
located, the number of the provider, and that it is the refugee’s responsibility to call and
set up an appointment. DSS also sends a letter to the provider to let them know the
refugee is going to be calling and how to set up the invoice, etc. Although this training is
technically available, Lutheran caseworkers commented that this service is rarely
administered due to the bureaucratic steps involved in realizing it.
Accessing human capital and taking advantage of networks to increase mobility is
a skill that many refugees utilize. It stands to reason that the larger one’s ethnic network,
the more opportunities for rides they find. Undoubtedly, interviewees from Myanmar
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(who constitute around 50% of Columbia’s established refugee population) benefited the
most from rides from co-ethnic networks. Through running the Carolina Survivors
Garden program, I have experienced that it is much more likely that Karen participants
can find somebody to give a ride to the garden, while Congolese and Eritrean participants
are not able to do so. Interviewee R1 discussed all the rides and help she got from her
friend when she arrived to Columbia, but that friend has since moved to Maine, leaving
R1 immobile. When questioned if he ever charges his friends for gas money, interviewee
R2 responded incredulously that he would never ask money from his friends, for that
would bring shame – they help each other at different times in different ways, no scores
kept. However, one Congolese woman I spoke with who has lived in Columbia around
eight months and works in a vegetable factory told me she gets to ride via Burmese
carpool. They charge her $20/week to travel 30 miles round trip per day, five days a
week. When I shared this story with another Eritrean man, he reported his son got rides to
the same vegetable factory via Burmese coworkers when he arrived five years ago. This
may explain the feeling of tension/accusations of favoritism between Burmese and other
refugees; however, the scope of this thesis cannot explore those intricacies.
Not only do friends give rides to friends of similar ethnicities, but friends help
friends find and purchase cars. The six interviewees with cars always found them through
social networks. Interviewees R7 & R8 received ample gifts from their pastor, who is a
well-established figure in the Christian Burmese community in Columbia. The pastor
gifted the couple a bicycle immediately upon arrival; when that bicycle was stolen, he
gave them another one. He also helped them to find car, as he has done for multiple
members of his congregation. Couple R9 & R10 had family living here that fronted the
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money for them to buy a car upon arrival. Interviewee R2 was able to find his car by
making friends with Arab immigrants who own a convenience store located immediately
next to one of the main refugee apartment complexes. Interviewee R3 skirted around the
issue of needing a license to purchase a car (he was still in his six-month permit waiting
period). His friend, who is also Iraqi, told him about an African friend who had access to
a special auction. “Nobody, even you, you cannot go to the auction and buy the car,” he
ominously told me. He simply told the secret auction member which car he would like,
and his friend purchased it for him.
5.3 Appropriation
Lastly, Kaufmann (2011) asserts that no matter how widely available public and
private transit is nor how trained a person is to use it, they still must appropriate those
factors to transform potential motility into actual mobility. Traditional transit studies that
equated structure with mobility removed the choices that people make – that is, their
agency – from the equation. One significant factor that affects a refugee’s choice to use
the bus or not is safety. Although all interviewees were settled near a bus line, the
walking route to and from the bus stops was hilly, curvy, and did not have sidewalks.
Another non-interviewee with whom I spoke was resettled in a different part of town and
required a 30-minute walk to and from bus stops on a path that is not well-lit. She
expressed the fear she felt in walking home after dark, and pointed out the irony that her
caseworker told her never to walk alone, especially not in the dark, while also expecting
her to commute to her job from that location.
Another participant, R8, generally felt unsafe in her apartment complex. She and
her husband had come home to find their window broken by a rock. After that incident,
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they took more precautions, including always closing and locking the door and being
more wary of going outside. She commented, “I’m scared around here. My husband say,
don’t open the door. Before, [when] I cooked, I opened the door (laughs). But [the pastor]
sa[id], don’t do like this. Some people come in, they say.” Aside from safety concerns in
their own neighborhoods, another refugee woman I spoke with had been confronted with
ugly words and insults on the bus because of her hijab identifying her as Muslim. She
said although she knows how to ride the bus now, she doesn’t like to. This incident took
place over a year ago; the political climate towards Muslims in South Carolina and across
the West has only gotten harsher since then.
One significant note is that safety concerns always came from female
interviewees. This fear is heavily tied with the built environment (open/closed, welllit/dark, private/public access). However, the geography of fear cannot be separated from
the social nature of places (dangerous/safe) and women’s social positions (low income,
members of ethnic minority groups, and those with disabilities are at higher risk of
violence and report higher levels of fear) (Koskela & Pain 2000). Interviewee responses
in Columbia align with previous literature on fear and its effects on women’s daily
mobilities. Of the three husband-and-wife couples interviewed, none of the wives
traveled without their husbands, citing fear of being alone in public. Two of those couples
have a car, and in each case it is the husband with the driver’s license. Interviewee R8
said that she plans to get a driver’s license and studies for the test on the Internet, but she
was three months pregnant at the time and not planning to take the test soon. Interviewee
R4, who was part of the couple who did not own a car, also planned to get a license some
day. When asked if they were attending English classes, all three female respondents
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commented they did not feel comfortable taking the bus alone to class while their
husbands were at work. These women seemingly always stayed at home while their
husbands worked, so naturally it was more important for their husbands to get the license
first. Although none of these women have had hostile experiences directed against them
in Columbia that they shared with me, their fears of traversing Columbia alone reflect a
broader environment that is unwelcoming to immigrants/non-white females.
Asserting mobility, whether it be on public transit, learning to drive, or
ridesharing, requires boldness. Personalities and comfort asking for a ride may dictate
whether a person takes advantage of motility opportunities or not. Interviewees R4 and
R5, a Muslim couple, mentioned that they have received multiple ride offers from other
Muslims who identify them while walking. According to traditional thought on co-ethnic
immigrant networks, one would assume that the couple regularly relies on such rides.
However, this couple simply does not want to based on fear of being bothersome. I asked
the interviewees if they got the phone number of these “ride angels” for future rides or in
case they have a problem. R4 responded, “No, I don’t want to bother anybody because
they always say, ‘take my phone.’ They give the phone number to us and they said,
‘Whenever you need any help you can call us. Whenever you want to go, you can call.’ I
don’t want bother them…they work too.” This interviewee would rather walk and
struggle with mobility than inconvenience others. She noted that the people offering rides
have been Indian and Arab Muslims, differing from her own Southeast Asian ethnicity.
This could play a role in discomfort of asking for favors, or the couple could simply be
shy, as they claimed.
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Considering differences in ethnicity serves as a transition to the final factor
refugees exhibited in appropriating mobility: positionality. Depending on a person’s
socio-economic status, asserting mobility evokes different feelings and expectations.
Cresswell (2010) exemplifies this subjective mobility when he states, “driving a car is
liberating, or nerve wracking, or, increasingly, guilt ridden” (p. 20). The aforementioned
Muslim woman who received hateful comments on the bus now has an expectation for
her mobility to be unpleasant. Interviewee R7 completed his written and driver’s test,
obtained a driving permit, and owned a car (with help from his Pastor). However,
because he had not established a large network, he did not have any already licensed
drivers to accompany him on every trip he took for six months prior to receiving his
license. He told me,
“So, I say, what about now, I go to the job, I have to drive. I have no transport,
[no]thing. So they say, in Columbia, you can drive. But don’t make any big
mistakes. No exam, no nothing, but drive carefully [DMV staff] say, they told me
that. So, I don’t go anywhere that’s very far, I go nearby here, that’s all.”
Surprisingly, the DMV staff encouraged him to skirt the law in order to
accommodate his needs to get to work. While it was surely somewhat relieving to have
their blessing, the limitations of driving only nearby and illegally produce a precarious
circumstance for many refugee drivers. This driver is disadvantaged because his social
network has far fewer available people with driver’s licenses than a native-born person
yet he must drive illegally to work. Driving gets him from point A to point B, but the
experience is nerve wracking, as Cresswell states.
As experienced by refugees in Columbia, accessing mobility is not as simple as
having reliable transit lines. Structural access is the first step in being mobile, but beyond
that, it is necessary for refugees to obtain skills and to be comfortable with modes of
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mobility. While structure is relatively fixed and takes years to improve (including saving
money for a car), refugees obtain skills from their more experienced social networks. As
refugee networks in Columbia grow, hopefully newly arrived refugees will have better
access to the tools that make them mobile. As for appropriation of feeling comfortable in
the community, larger processes of acceptance and welcoming narratives must take place.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
As exhibited in this thesis, refugee resettlement in the US is shortsighted to focus
solely on economic self-sufficiency. Contrary to the federal government’s claims that
economic self-sufficiency eases integration, the almost total focus on getting a job
precludes refugees from learning English and participating in society. They may be able
to pay their rent after three months of living in society, but the perpetuation of bare
survival disallows any further monetary or personal growth. The scaling-back of refugee
financial assistance has sought to reduce government spending, but by bringing refugees
here and under-supporting them, they are unlikely to become economically stable
members of society. A lack of upward social mobility has implications for future
generations of refugee children whose parents will unlikely be able to pay rising college
tuition costs; in Columbia, service providers know of only one refugee student who
currently attends university. This failure especially affects refugee children who are
placed in states without the educational infrastructure to accommodate them, such as
South Carolina. Success at the most basic level of economic self-sufficiency perpetuates
poverty, in opposition to what neoliberal expectations theoretically aim to produce.
Further, the federal government applies these directives across the board to all
refugees in the US, which assumes they are a homogenous population with the same
access to resources. As exhibited in Chapter 4, however, the landscape of resettlement
varies widely depending on the state, city size, and resettlement organization. Given that
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refugees are not able to choose which state they settle into (and have resources revoked if
they move), it is far beyond their personal agency to control these factors. How, then, can
the federal government expect the same results in the same amount of time from such a
non-standardized process? Refugees are an incredibly heterogeneous population with
varying skills, education levels, class backgrounds, and networks, all of which can
impinge on employment rates and mobility. Despite this and varying services from state
to state, refugees are held to the same standards by the federal government across the
board. An illiterate Congolese farmer in South Carolina is expected to meet the same
employable time frame and pass the same citizenship tests as an Iraqi with a PhD in San
Diego, and if these standards are not met, he is stranded in a hostile landscape without
access to basic human services. The U.S. government seeks to effectively invest their aid
in refugees by giving them the bare minimum. In doing so, they create inefficiencies that
oftentimes place refugees barely above the poverty line at the cost of quality of life.
Refugee agency depends on the tools they are given from various actors:
voluntary agencies, social networks, communities, as well as the degree to which the built
environment is or is not easily navigable. While refugees do have a few choices such as
how to spend the little cash assistance they receive, most of their life choices are
restricted by structures in place. VOLAGs, too, have limited choices for how they direct
their efforts. Although each step of resettlement is not closely monitored, VOLAGs have
little leeway or time to focus on anything other than finding refugee employment in 90
days or less. Underfunded VOLAGs in an unsupportive state means refugees depend on
independent volunteers to provide basic services, thus creating a fragmented landscape of
official and unofficial services. Refugees’ own prior skillsets and aptitudes dictate how
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they participate in the work force as well as their ability to move about the city. Mobility
is key; in order to fulfill neoliberal expectations of a hard-working New American, a
refugee must first be able to arrive at his or her job.
6.1. Pragmatic Approaches to Resettlement
For now, those who advocate for refugee resettlement must be strategic in
deciding what their best course of action is. In order to improve refugee self-sufficiency,
refugee advocates must focus on changing what is malleable in Columbia. Due to
overarching political discussions on the state of refugees, it is unlikely that more funding
and fewer restrictions will be provided any time soon. Rather, as historically shown,
perhaps the government will determine fewer than three months is enough time for
refugees to become economically ‘self-sufficient’. The focus must be on aiding refugees
in becoming more mobile within Columbia so that they may more easily access key
resources, including English classes and job opportunities. Structurally, the city of
Columbia is planning for more bus lines; however, carrying out these plans takes years
and funds to buy more buses. Coupled with local anti-refugee sentiment, it is difficult to
advocate for more convenient bus lines specifically for them without inciting hate that
ultimately will be directed back towards refugees.
Increasing a refugee’s skillset and comfort in appropriating those skills is the best
avenue for increasing their mobility. LSC must focus on immediate and consistent bus
training. If they are not able to provide it, they need to utilize their volunteer core and
assure that this service is being delivered. It is important to find allies among the
naysayers, such as the aforementioned travel trainers with Central Midlands Transit who
are willing to show refugees around. Partnerships must be formed quietly in order to
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avoid political backlash, but as ugly anti-refugee expressions have come out, they have
been met with a smaller but equally as passionate pro-refugee population who are willing
to help.
6.2 Future Research
As this study was a master’s thesis, the scope of research allowed only for sixteen
in-depth interviewees, though these were supplemented by a larger number of observed
participants. While this allowed general patterns to emerge, there is room for an
expanded analysis of the experiences of refugees by conducting formal interviews with a
larger sample size. From a GIS standpoint, a more high-tech approach using global
positioning technology would allow for a more detailed picture of refugee travel
experiences. This precise measurement would illuminate lengthy travel and waiting times
in a more effective way than travel diaries could allow.
My research did not focus on variables such as religion or ethnicity in gauging
levels of mobility. However, I did sense a general pattern that Christian refugees had
more support from local church volunteers, as well as co-ethnic Christian networks. In
comparing the size of local Christian networks with Muslim, it is evident that there is
simply more support offered. I asked Christian volunteer interviewees who teach weekly
in-home citizenship classes if they only offered those services to Christian refugees. They
were firm in their stance that anybody is welcome and they did not limit classes to
Christians. Still, upon attending the class, I saw that the final 30 minutes were devoted to
reading bible scripture, which may be off-putting or exclusionary for some refugee
attendants. These details offer a space for more teasing out and comparative studies on
how the religion of refugees affects the services they receive in Columbia, and, more
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broadly, the context of the south. SP 1 discussed how when the Somali Bantu people
were turned away from Cayce, evangelical faith communities in Columbia attempted to
help, but were uncomfortable and conflicted about helping Muslims who would not
convert to Christianity.
Another place for expansion on research is exploring the current political climate
and laws as they affect resettlement. Nationally, individual states’ identities are emerging
as clearly more or less welcoming to refugees. How, in the future, will this narrative
shape refugee resettlement? As refugees are not able to choose their primary resettlement
locations, will it have any effect at all? Will it increase secondary migration to the more
accepting states? One could also interrogate specific anti-refugee narratives and the fearladen claims that come with them. By revealing how unfounded and ludicrous the fear of
refugee resettlement is, perhaps there is a chance for a more welcoming landscape.
Research on refugee resettlement in a small city such as this thesis provides
documentation to the lived experiences of individuals the U.S. government places within
its borders. Although the number of refugees resettled within South Carolina is
comparatively fewer than in larger metro areas, they deserve not to be overlooked. State
officials oppose resettling and financially supporting refugees in South Carolina; as well,
low resettlement numbers make it difficult to receive competitive national grants. At the
time of this writing, a local doctor who is starting therapeutic programs for survivors of
torture in South Carolina has applied to and been denied over 25 national grants for
refugee programs, precisely because of the small number of refugees. My hope is that this
thesis and future research helps to elucidate resettlement in smaller cities and give
refugees a fair chance towards their own vision of success in America.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW TEMPLATES
Refugee Interview Question Template
1. Situation and Location
•
•
•

What is your household situation? How many people live with you? Are these
family members? Friends? Others?
In what area/neighborhood do you live in now and how did you find this location?
Where do you go on a daily basis (work, shop, play, socialize, worship) and how
do you get there?

2. Challenges, Mobility, and Mediation
•
•
•
•
•
•

What challenges do you face in Columbia? Do you find it easy or difficult to live
in Columbia? Why/why not?
How have things changed for you since you arrived in Columbia? Are things
easier now than they were 6 months ago? Why or why not?
Do you have a driver’s license? Do you have access to a car? Do you use public
transportation? How easy or difficult is it to use public transit for daily tasks?
What agencies and organizations have offered help to you since you arrived in
Columbia? Were the services they offered helpful to you?
Who are your friends here in Columbia, how did you meet them, and how do you
help each other?
Do you have anyone (friends or family members) who takes you places or helps
you get to work, shopping, appointments, etc.?

3. Food Security
•
•
•
•
•

Do you normally use more than food stamp money to buy food?
Do you eat the kinds of foods you want to eat?
Do you worry that money for food will run out before the end of the month?
Do you ever cut the size of or skip meals to save money?
Do you ever go hungry because you do not have money for food?

4. Becoming part of Columbia
•
•

Where do you want to be in the future, and what do you hope to be doing? What
do you think you need to do or have to achieve your goals? Is Columbia a place
you’d like to stay? Why or why not?
What would help you the most in making your life in Columbia better/easier?
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Service Provider Interview Question Template
1. Organizational Situation and Location
•
•

Tell me about your organization. When was it established? Where is it located
and why? What are the services it provides?
What is your role at the organization?

2. Challenges, Mobility, and Mediation
•
•
•
•
•

What challenges has your organization faced in providing services to refugees?
What challenges have you seen refugees face in Columbia?
Is transportation a problem for the people you serve?
Does your organization work to increase refugee mobility? If so, how?
How does your organization help refugees overcome aforementioned challenges?
What difference do you think you might be making in the resettlement process?

3. Refugee integration
•
•
•
•

What is successful resettlement to your agency?
What do you envision to be the best-case scenario for refugees’ life in Columbia?
What do you think you could be doing better as an organization?
What resources do you need to achieve your aims?
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